ILEA - Integrated Law Enforcement Approach
(Mengurangi Laju deforestasi menggunakan instrument anti korupsi dan anti pencucian uang)
 
Korupsi
  • Buscaglia, Edgardo (2008) "The Paradox of Expected Punishment: Legal and Economic Factors Determining Success and Failure in the Fight against Organized Crime," Review of Law & Economics: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1, Article 14

    Hasil sebuah studi memperlihatkan penegakkan hukum yang tidak disertai dengan mekanisme Asset Forfeiture/Penyitaan Aset, malah akan meningkatkan kemungkinan terjadinya praktek korupsi di kalangan pejabat publik. Hal tersebut terjadi karena Organisasi kejahatan akan mengompensasikan makin kuatnya penegakkan hukum dengan melakukan lebih sering penyuapan atau bahkan mencari pengaruh di kalangan pejabat publik. Kondisi paradok terjadi: makin banyak anggota organisasi kejahatan yang masuk penjara, namun pada saat yang sama kejahatan tetap berjalan dan korupsi di kalangan pejabat publik juga tetap tinggi....Selengkapnya
     
  • Campos, J. Edgardo., Pradhan, Sanjay.,( eds.), 2007. The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

    "...Corruption, as the term is used in this volume, refers to the use of public office for private gain. It can take on a multitude of faces; its scale can be grand or petty. To make the analysis tractable, this volume classifies corruption into three broad types: state capture, patronage and nepotism, and administrative corruption, as defined earlier. A road map offers a parsimonious organizing framework for identifying and tracking vulnerabilities corresponding to this typology.

    State capture is often equated with grand corruption or political corruption. While these forms of corruption overlap significantly, they are not equivalent. Patronage is politically motivated, and administrative corruption can involve huge sums (“commissions” from huge, rigged procurement contracts, for example). For purposes of this volume, grand corruption refers to corruption that involves extraordinarily large side payments; political corruption refers to favors exchanged for support, financial or otherwise, to buttress or sustain the political power of individuals or groups (such as illegal campaign contributions)...".

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  • Kishor, Nalin, and Richard Damania. 2006.“Crime and Justice in the Garden of Eden: Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption in the Forestry Sector.” In J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan, eds. The Many Faces of Corruption:Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level.Washington, DC: The World Bank.

    "...These spillover effects of forest corruption are the most far-reaching and significant aspect of the problem. The corrosive effects of illegal logging, especially on governance, are not confined to the forest sector. Forest products are bulky, and illegal lumber could be easily intercepted by officials. So the connivance and corruption of a range of officials—customs, police, local politicians, and transport authorities—are needed for the industry to survive. Corruption in the forest sector is therefore contagious and weakens governance through other segments of the economy. The effects of corruption spread further by providing opportunities for money laundering, weakening the rule of law in forest areas, diluting the effectiveness of policies, generating trade distortions, and disrupting legitimate economic activities more generally. For Indonesia, it is estimated that as much as $5 billion is generated through illegal activities in the forest sector, all completely outside the control of fiscal authorities and free to spread corruption contagion throughout the economy..."
     
  • Reed, Quentin, 2008, Sitting in The Fence: Conflicts of interest and how to regulate them, U4 Issue No. 6, 2008

    "....This is especially important because there is a widespread tendency within the community of anti-corruption practitioners to confuse conflict of interest situations with actual corrupt or unethical behaviour....In reality, conflict of interest is properly understood as a situation, not an action, and it is clear that a public official may find him or herself in a conflict of interest situation without actually behaving corruptly.... Indeed, it is all but inevitable that a public official will face situations where the public interest s/he has been elected or appointed to serve will conflict with other interests to which s/he is subject...."
     
  • Setiono, Bambang, 2008, Corruption and Forest Revenues in Papua, U4 Brief, June 2008, No. 18

    "....Corruption is an important factor in explaining why revenues from Papua’s forests have not delivered the expected
    socio-economic benefi ts. Though government officials have the power and mandate to properly manage forest fi nances, the incentives for making forest revenues work for the Papuan people are weak. Part of the problem
    relates to low wages among government officials. Bribes worth 100 times more than their mediocre incomes (US$500 a month) are certainly hard to resist, especially where sanctions from law enforcement agencies are largely absent. But more fundamental institutional and informational problems within the revenue collection system also exist, providing opportunities for bribery and mismanagement on the part of both government officials and private sector employees...."

    download dari ILEA......
     

  • UNDP, 2008. Asia Pacific Human Development Report. Tackling Corruption, Transforming Lives: Accelerating Human Development in Asia and the Pacific.

    ......Forestry Forest products contribute to an average of 10 per cent of the GDP in some of the world’s poorest countries. While the forest area has increased slightly in industrial countries since 1980, it has declined by almost 10 per cent in developing countries.22 Deforestation is also causing massive loss of biodiversity, flooding and soil erosion while exacerbating global climate change.........

    download dari ILEA....
     

  • World Bank. 2006. Strengthening forest law enforcement and governance: addressing a systemic constraint to sustainable development. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Environment and Agriculture and Rural Development Departments. Sustainable Development Networks. 77p. Report No. 36638-GLB
     (available at CIFOR Library)
     
  • Transparency International Asia Pacific. 2007. Workshop Summary of Forestry and Corruption Programme Development Workshop, 25th – 27 July 2007, Bangkok. Thailand.  
     
  • ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and The Pacific, Denying Safe Haven to Corrupt and The Proceeds of Corruption: Enhancing Asia-Pacific Cooperation on Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition, and Return of Proceeds of Corruption, 2006, Asian Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

    " This seminar report is trying to capture the Asia/Pacific countries combating corruption which, as happen on other regions, increasingly has take on international dimension. As Willian Loo remark: "...Countries in this region increasingly need to gather evidence abroad and to seek the return of fugitives for trial in corruption cases. Many would also like to ensure the repatriation of proceeds of corruption that have been exported..." [page 3]. To pursue that aim, the countries need Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance as crucial tool for fight against corruption. Both are now considered more important for Asia/Pasific countries than ever before. The report also highlighted the alternative and informal ways/tools that are often overlooked, on combating corruption in international dimension due to many Asia-Pacific countries and jurisdictions do not have formal bilateral or multilateral MLA relations with other countries..."

    selengkapnya di OECD....