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This project ended in November 2009. This website was last updated in June 2010. We have kept the website available for our readers' convenience. For information on CIFOR's current research, please click here.
Corruption
- Buscaglia, Edgardo (2008) "The
Paradox of Expected Punishment: Legal and Economic Factors Determining
Success and Failure in the Fight against Organized Crime," Review of
Law & Economics: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1,
Article 14.
"....in the absence of an active financial intelligence-based criminal
asset forfeiture program, high-level corruption grows rapidly while,
paradoxically, public sectors continue to devote more criminal justice
system resources to incarcerating/convicting increasing numbers of organized
crime members. At the same time, empirical analysis shows that higher
probabilities of sanctions aimed at physical persons combined with stiffer
sentencing guidelines in the books against organized crime members do not
play their dissuasive role in the absence of preventive programs to reduce
the flow of youth to criminal groups. This constitutes the paradox of
criminal sanctions where more frequent and stiffer punishments applied to
physical persons lead to higher levels of organized crime and higher level
corruption...."
ILEA
have more
- Campos, J. Edgardo., Pradhan, Sanjay.,( eds.), 2007.
The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
"...Corruption, as the term is used in this volume, refers to the use of
public office for private gain. It can take on a multitude of faces; its
scale can be grand or petty. To make the analysis tractable, this volume
classifies corruption into three broad types: state capture, patronage
and nepotism, and administrative corruption, as defined earlier. A road
map offers a parsimonious organizing framework for identifying and tracking
vulnerabilities corresponding to this typology.
State capture is often equated with grand corruption or political
corruption. While these forms of corruption overlap significantly, they are
not equivalent. Patronage is politically motivated, and administrative
corruption can involve huge sums (“commissions” from huge, rigged
procurement contracts, for example). For purposes of this volume, grand
corruption refers to corruption that involves extraordinarily large side
payments; political corruption refers to favors exchanged for support,
financial or otherwise, to buttress or sustain the political power of
individuals or groups (such as illegal campaign contributions)...".
Download
the book.....
- Kishor, Nalin, and Richard Damania. 2006.“Crime and Justice in the
Garden of Eden: Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption in the Forestry
Sector.” In J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan, eds. The Many Faces of
Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level. Washington, DC: The
World Bank.
"...These spillover effects of forest corruption are the most far-reaching
and significant aspect of the problem. The corrosive effects of illegal
logging, especially on governance, are not confined to the forest sector.
Forest products are bulky, and illegal lumber could be easily intercepted by
officials. So the connivance and corruption of a range of officials—customs,
police, local politicians, and transport authorities—are needed for the
industry to survive. Corruption in the forest sector is therefore contagious
and weakens governance through other segments of the economy. The effects of
corruption spread further by providing opportunities for money laundering,
weakening the rule of law in forest areas, diluting the effectiveness of
policies, generating trade distortions, and disrupting legitimate economic
activities more generally. For Indonesia, it is estimated that as much as $5
billion is generated through
illegal activities in the forest sector, all completely outside the control
of fiscal authorities and free to spread corruption contagion throughout the
economy..."
- Reed, Quentin, 2008,
Sitting in The Fence: Conflicts of interest and how to regulate them, U4
Issue No. 6, 2008
"....This is especially important because there is a widespread tendency
within the community of anti-corruption practitioners to confuse conflict of
interest situations with actual corrupt or unethical behavior....In
reality, conflict of interest is properly understood as a situation, not an
action, and it is clear that a public official may find him or herself in a
conflict of interest situation without actually behaving corruptly....
Indeed, it is all but inevitable that a public official will face situations
where the public interest s/he has been elected or appointed to serve will
conflict with other interests to which s/he is subject...."
- Setiono, Bambang, 2008,
Corruption and Forest Revenues in Papua, U4 Brief, June 2008, No. 18
"....Corruption is an important factor in explaining why revenues from
Papua’s forests have not delivered the expected socio-economic benefits. Though government officials have the power and
mandate to properly manage forest finances, the incentives for making
forest revenues work for the Papuan people are weak. Part of the problem relates to low wages among government officials. Bribes worth 100 times more
than their mediocre incomes (US$500 a month) are certainly hard to resist,
especially where sanctions from law enforcement agencies are largely absent.
But more fundamental institutional and informational problems within the
revenue collection system also exist, providing opportunities for bribery
and mismanagement on the part of both government officials and private
sector employees...."
Download the Brief....
- UNDP, 2008. Asia
Pacific Human Development Report. Tackling Corruption, Transforming
Lives: Accelerating Human Development in Asia and the Pacific.
ILEA have more......
- World Bank. 2006.Strengthening forest law enforcement and
governance: addressing a systemic constraint to sustainable development.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Environment and Agriculture and Rural
Development Departments. Sustainable Development Networks. 77p. Report No.
36638-GLB (available at CIFOR Library)
- Transparency International Asia Pacific. 2007.
Workshop Summary of
Forestry and Corruption Programme Development Workshop, 25th – 27 July 2007,
Bangkok. Thailand.
- ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and The Pacific,
Denying Safe Haven to
Corrupt and The Proceeds of Corruption: Enhancing Asia-Pacific Cooperation
on Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition, and Return of Proceeds of
Corruption, 2006, Asian Development Bank, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development.
" This seminar report is trying to capture the Asia/Pacific countries
combating corruption which, as happen on other regions, increasingly has
take on international dimension. As Willian Loo remark: "...Countries in
this region increasingly need to gather evidence abroad and to seek the
return of fugitives for trial in corruption cases. Many would also like to
ensure the repatriation of proceeds of corruption that have been
exported..." [page 3]. To pursue that aim, the countries need
Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance as crucial tool for fight against
corruption. Both are now considered more important for Asia/Pasific
countries than ever
before. The report also highlighted the alternative and informal ways/tools
that are often overlooked, on combating corruption in international
dimension due to many Asia-Pacific countries and jurisdictions do not have
formal bilateral or multilateral MLA relations with other countries..."
OECD
have more.......
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