Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve Initiative (Rimba Raya)1 is a for-profit forest carbon initiative in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. It is managed by InfiniteEARTH Limited, a private company based in Hong Kong. Through its registered business entity in Indonesia (PT. Rimba Raya Conservation or PT. RRC), it applied for an ERC license over a carbon accounting area (CAA) intended to protect an entire peat dome against planned conversion to oil palm plantations. MoFor granted the license over a part of the CAA, requiring the development of alternative management agreements between PT. RRC and actors such as oil palm companies and the district government. Together, the ERC license and agreements established the rights of use over the CAA, which is necessary for generating the more than 10 million carbon credits verified by VCS so far. However, there have been controversies about whether these alternative agreements are aligned with Indonesian regulations.
20.1 Basic facts: Where, who, why and when
Rimba Raya is located in Seruyan District, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, bordering on Tanjung Puting National Park (TPNP) in the west, and the Seruyan River in the east (Figure 20.1). The district covers approximately 16.5 million ha divided into six subdistricts, of which 9.2% is peatland (Kabupaten Seruyan n.d.-c). Oil palm and rubber are the most important agricultural commodities in this district (Kabupaten Seruyan n.d.-a,b). The most important source of protein in the local diet is fish, which is caught from the Seruyan River, lakes, wetlands and karamba or caged aquaculture (Kabupaten Seruyan n.d.-d).
Figure 20.1 Map of the Rimba Raya REDD+ initiative.
Data sources: InfiniteEarth, Google Maps, GADM, Central Kalimantan EMRP Master Plan 2008 and World Ocean Base.
The Rimba Raya reserve is divided into a 47,237 ha CAA, where carbon reductions are calculated, and a larger initiative management zone (PMZ). Settlements (pemukiman) are located in the PMZ, but not in the CAA. When PT. RRC was established in 2008, the company initially planned for a PMZ covering 101,730 ha. Between 2009 and 2013, the proposed PMZ area was 91,215 ha, after excluding areas already developed into oil palm plantations. After the ERC license was issued in 2013, the PMZ was reduced to 64,977 ha. Throughout these boundary changes, Rimba Raya maintained the same CAA boundary, as required by the VCS methodology.2
The Rimba Raya initiative works with villages located at least partly inside the PMZ. The households in these villages manage land both inside and outside of this PMZ. Due to the change in the PMZ boundary in 2013, Rimba Raya added one village in the south and excluded six villages in the north, resulting in nine villages in the PMZ, all targeted for interventions. Of the four villages surveyed by CIFOR-GCS (SERU1–SERU4) (Figure 20.1), one (SERU1) was excluded by the 2013 change in the PMZ.
The current PMZ consists of the ERC license issued by MoFor (36,331 ha) and a patchwork of land management agreements with oil palm companies (8,855 ha), the Seruyan district government (95 ha) and TPNP (18,780 ha). Rimba Raya also manages 850 ha of forest zoned for conversion (hutan produksi yang dapat dikonversi or HPK) (Dirjen Planologi Kehutanan 2013). Prior to the ERC license being issued, the area proposed for the PMZ was 41.2% forested and 33% in peat swamps. The mean peat depth in the accounting area was 4.6 m (Lemons et al. 2011). Almost 26% of the proposed PMZ was cleared land and oil palm plantation, and 2.4% was active or abandoned cultivation (Bolick 2010).
The total population of the 14 villages in the 2008 PMZ was at least 10,935 people (Lemons et al. 2011). According to interviews with key informants, the poorest people in the district live in villages along the Seruyan River, which includes all villages targeted by Rimba Raya. Average annual rainfall is approximately 2500–2700 mm (Bolick et al. 2010), and altitudes across the four study villages range from 4 m to 13 m. Access to the area is mainly via the Seruyan River.
Most lands in Central Kalimantan, including Seruyan district, are off limits to district governments because they are zoned as state forest under the jurisdiction of MoFor. Lands zoned as Area for Other Uses (Area Penggunaan Lain or APL) are under the jurisdiction of the districts, and are therefore considered important district assets. District governments want more state forests to be converted to APL for generating revenue, which is reflected in the provincial spatial plans (RTRW)3 proposed by Central Kalimantan. These plans have not been approved by the central government, and there are already conflicting land uses. In the case of Rimba Raya, the area proposed by the initiative overlaps with five oil palm plantations, each with location permits issued by the district head for 12,000–19,000 ha of land.
There are frequent conflicts between oil palm companies and villagers, typically when oil palm plantations are developed in village areas without the villagers’ consent. Communities have legally weak land ownership based on customary land tenure, while companies are in a relatively strong legal position with permits issued by the district head (Resosudarmo et al. 2014a). At least half of 14 villages in the original PMZ have experienced this type of conflict (Lemons et al. 2011, 61). The size of the areas in contention is often unclear but estimates range from 200–6000 ha per village (Lemons et al. 2011, 61).
20.1.2 Stakeholders and funding
InfiniteEARTH is the leading proponent that designs and implements the initiative. Its ownership is 100% foreign (personal communication from Procanik, 2014). Its registered business entity in Indonesia, PT.RRC, owns the ERC license (VCS 2011a; personal communication from Procanik 2014). Ninety percent of its startup funding was from private foreign investors. The balance was from forward credit purchases by Gazprom Marketing and Trading and grants from the Clinton Climate Initiative (personal communication from Procanik, 2014). It established its own VCS methodology with support from Shell Canada Ltd. (Lemons et al. 2011). Allianz (a German financial services giant) and Microsoft contracted to buy credits from Rimba Raya once they are available (Fogarty 2011).
TPNP is adjacent to the Rimba Raya reserve. It was established in 1982 and covers 415,040 ha (MoFor n.d.). By acting as a buffer zone, Rimba Raya hopes to reduce encroachment on TPNP. Rimba Raya has partnered with civil society organizations, consulting companies/experts, financial service providers and research institutes (Ginting 2010). Specifically for community development, it partnered with NGOs (World Education, Health in Harmony) and financial service providers (MBK Financial Services,Yayasan Mitra Dhuafa [YAMIDA]). For climate change mitigation, it partnered with Winrock International (carbon monitoring), Technofire Consulting Group (community-based fire brigades) and Camm Webb (low-impact horticulture practices). It collaborated with Orangutan Foundation International (OFI) for orangutan monitoring, research and repatriation, and Daemeter Consulting for biodiversity monitoring. Environmental Accounting Services, and Remote Sensing Solutions were consulted for carbon accounting and monitoring (InfiniteEARTH 2013).
Other institutions can also be considered stakeholders in the initiative, because of their roles in REDD+ and land-use planning. These include various agencies within MoFor (e.g. the Forestry Research and Development Agency [FORDA], the Forest Planning Agency [BAPLAN], and the Forest Protection and Nature Conservation [PHKA] under MoFOR), the Environmental Agency (BLH) and the Natural Resources Conservation Agency (BKSDA) at the provincial level, the Seruyan district government, and the National REDD+ Task Force.
InfiniteEARTH saw potential to generate substantial revenues from the voluntary carbon market and chose the Rimba Raya site because of its large carbon stocks and potential to produce carbon credits. To help market the credits, it sought certification from VCS and CCBA and was verified by both in 2013. Its local partners (e.g. TPNP, OFI and World Education), had long-term experience in the area, which also helps strengthen investor appeal. The PDD projected that 105,863,425 tCO2e in emissions from the CAA would be avoided during the 30-year initiative (SCS 2011). Of this amount, VCS has verified 2.2 million tCO2e from July 2009 until June 2010, and 8.5 million tCO2e from July 2010 to June 2013 (Environmental Services, Inc. 2013; SCS Global Services 2013). Satriastanti (2014) reports that half of the credits have been sold.
The provincial government of Central Kalimantan is supportive of REDD+ implementation. In September 2011, the province became the first REDD+ pilot province in Indonesia (Satgas REDD+ and Pemprov Kalteng 2011). In 2013, Central Kalimantan published its own provincial REDD+ strategy document (Rusan et al. 2013). As of 2014, Rimba Raya is the first and only REDD+ initiative in the Seruyan district.
Since 2000, planned deforestation and government policies to convert land (including peatland) and forest into oil palm plantations have been the main threats to forests in the initiative site (Lemons et al. 2011). Oil palm plantations in the district have expanded rapidly, providing jobs and attracting migrant workers. From 2008 to March 2014, the district government issued 43 oil palm concession licenses covering 598,815 ha. However, 10 of them (113,611 ha) are operating illegally from the national government’s perspective because they do not have permits to operate in state forests, where their concessions are located (Borneo News 2014).
We divide Rimba Raya’s timeline into a preparation phase (before the ERC license was issued) and a field implementation phase (after the license was issued) (Figure 20.2). The preparation phase consisted of the establishment of Rimba Raya as an initiative, the FPIC processes, feasibility studies and the ERC licensing process, and of preparation and validation for CCBA and VCS. The field implementation phase included VCS and CCBA verification and interventions at the village level. For the purposes of our study, we consider the issuance of the ERC license as the start of field implementation, based on our observations during fieldwork in 2010, 2011 and 2013. Figure 20.2 summarizes key events across both the preparation phase and the field implementation phase.
Figure 20.2 Timeline of the Rimba Raya REDD+ initiative.
The ERC license process took four years and passed through five milestones (Pelayanan Informasi Perizinan Kementerian Kehutanan 2012). First, PT. RRC submitted its proposal for an ERC license to MoFor in April 2009. Second, MoFor issued a First Letter of Order (Surat Perintah 1 [SP1]), which acknowledged the ecosystem restoration plans and asked the company to submit an environmental impact assessment within six months (December 2009). Third, MoFor issued a Second Letter of Order (Surat Perintah 2 [SP2]), which ordered MoFor’s forest planning bureau (Badan Planologi [BAPLAN]) to issue a working area map (June 2010). This step identifies whether the proposed area is legally clean and clear for being managed as an ERC. It revealed that there were several overlaps with oil palm concessions in the area, leading to delays in the licensing process. The fourth milestone was achieved three years later, when in March 2013, MoFor issued a ministerial decree for the ERC license. The company must pay a USD 0.6 million license fee,4 which is calculated based on the number of years and hectares the ERC license is valid, and must be paid upfront within one month of the issuance of the ministerial decree (PT.RRC and OFI 2011; Pelayanan Informasi Perizinan Kementerian Kehutanan 2012; Hendroyono 2013; Antara/PT. RRC 2014).
The ERC license granted by MoFor was for 36,331 ha, which only partially covered Rimba Raya’s CAA. To secure its user rights over the remaining CAA, Rimba Raya had to negotiate directly with actors driving deforestation in the area, such as oil palm companies. It also negotiated with the Seruyan district government so that some non-forest zone areas could be managed as ecosystem restoration areas, and could act as a buffer for TPNP. The resulting agreements enabled Rimba Raya to proceed with verification by VCS and CCBA. In May 2013, MoFor issued a letter considering Rimba Raya’s proposed management area of 64,881 ha for an ecosystem restoration business. This area combines the various agreements and the ERC permit (Dirjen Planologi Kehutanan 2013).
Our first field survey took place from August to November 2010, in the middle of a comment period for communities, as part of the CCBA FPIC process. In November 2011, we returned survey results and noted updates about Rimba Raya’s implementation in our study villages. This took place during a ‘quiet period’ in the field, when Rimba Raya was focused on gaining management rights over the entire CAA. Village heads were informed by Rimba Raya that field activities were suspended due to licensing issues, but many other key informants thought that the initiative had been cancelled. Our second survey was done from November to December 2013, after management rights had been acquired through various agreements. The initiative was visible and active in the communities during this survey. Verified carbon credits were issued by VCS and CCBA between June 2013 and January 2014, including back-credits for two crediting periods starting in mid-2009 (Environmental Services, Inc. 2013; SCS Global Services 2013).
20.2 Strategy for the initiative
Rimba Raya’s PMZ was partially designated as Kawasan Pengembangan Produksi (Area for Development of Production) in the 2003 spatial plan proposed by the Central Kalimantan provincial government (Government of Central Kalimantan 2003). Rimba Raya argued that this was planned conversion of forests into land uses such as oil palm (Bolick et al. 2010). However, the proposed spatial plan has not been accepted by the central government. The area officially remains zoned as state forest, where applying for an ERC is permitted and conversion to oil palm is not.
Due to these threats, Rimba Raya developed a methodology specifically targeting “corporate or governmental entities (plantation companies, national or provincial forestry departments, etc.) and not [deforestation] by community groups, community-based organizations, individuals or households” (VCS 2010, 5). This is achieved by acquiring an ERC license to prevent planned oil palm expansion into its PMZ. Potential negative leakage from displacing the companies elsewhere was expected, especially on the north and south parts of the initiative boundary (Bolick et al. 2010).
Based on a brochure distributed in villages in 2010 and interviews with key informants, Rimba Raya planned to restrict forest use such as illegal and unsustainable timber removals, fishing using illegal and unsustainable practices (e.g. electrofishing and using fire), changing land uses, buying/selling land, and hunting (unless permitted by law). Rimba Raya also planned to release 300 rehabilitated orangutans in its intervention area (Lemons et al. 2011, 23). Communities will be allowed to harvest NTFPs such as rattan and pantung (Dyera lowii) latex, and to fish using sustainable methods.
In return, Rimba Raya will implement social programs to improve general income and well being. These include developing agroforestry systems, introducing a clear water program, improving early child education and increasing employment linked to forest protection (e.g. forest patrols, fire prevention, reforestation). A memo of support drafted by Rimba Raya states that communities will receive “a significant share of the economic benefits generated” (PT. RRC 2009). In 2014, Rimba Raya delivered village development grants valued at around USD 3800 to each of the nine villages targeted by Rimba Raya (Antara/PT. RRC 2014). PT. RRC envisioned some funds would be distributed to BKSDA and the TPNP, and to capacity building for district government officials. There are agreements with two oil palm companies that overlap with Rimba Raya’s CAA, but it is not clear if and how benefit sharing is included. A 10% fee payable to MoFor applies to sales of carbon credits (GoI 2014).
Based on our fieldwork in 2010, Rimba Raya’s forest restriction plans caused worries in our study villages and could affect customary land rights, logging activities and gemor bark collection.5 In one study village, these plans also evoked painful memories of being evicted from one of their settlements used for logging in the forest in the 1960s, by “foreigners who cared more about orangutans than local people.” The map of Rimba Raya’s PMZ in its brochure included lands that key informants felt were owned and managed by villagers. Key informants in SERU1 and SERU2 were worried that restrictions against ‘changing land use’ and selling/trading land would be applied to these lands. Key informants in SERU1 were worried about the orangutan release because they believed orangutans could harm people working in the forests or rubber gardens, and damage agricultural plants. Some of these key informants were relieved that their village is no longer part of Rimba Raya.
Although 14 village heads signed a memo supporting Rimba Raya during the initiative preparation phase (PT. RRC 2009), we found that in the four study villages, the memos were signed only by the village head without a witness from the village government. Several informants in two study villages were still unsure about Rimba Raya and wanted to wait and see how the initiative develops. There was resistance against Rimba Raya in one study village in which people were more supportive of oil palm plantations. There, Rimba Raya was seen as a threat to oil palm plantations, and one that does not offer clear benefits to their village. Informants in two study villages mentioned that there was very little time for villagers to ask questions of Rimba Raya staff, because the staff spent only one to two days in each village to introduce the forest restriction plans (see also Fuad 2010; Pareira 2010).
During the licensing process in 2011–2012, there was very little activity at the village level. Because of the hiatus, many villagers were still unsure about what exactly Rimba Raya would do. In 2013, Rimba Raya sprang back to life after receiving its ERC license. During our visit in 2013, we found that activities related to CCBA and VCS verification processes were implemented. PT. RRC staff reviewed village development plans (RPJMDES) in the nine target villages, to see if there were activities that were already planned by the village that they could support. Negative perceptions against orangutan release and restrictions on land transfers remained.
20.3 Smallholders in the initiative
Data presented in this section is based on group surveys (village leaders and women) and key informant interviews with village leaders, community members and Rimba Raya staff. In addition, we interviewed initiative stakeholders in August–November 2010, and again in 2013 when we returned to present preliminary findings from a follow-up survey. We did not conduct a household survey. Study villages (SERU1 to SERU4) are located along the Seruyan River, which also provides the main access route as there are no roads to the villages. The study villages ranged in size from 8000 ha to 47,000 ha and at the time of data collection, there were 912 households in total. Based on key informant estimates, forest cover varied from 25% to 80%. Each study village had an elementary school and a health center, and two villages had a secondary school. Markets were located near the village center or, in the case of one village, a market was located in a neighboring village. Mobile phone signal was limited. There was no access to formal credit in 2010. Three of the four study villages were dominated by local Dayak ethnic groups, while one was dominated by the Banjarese from South Kalimantan. The main decision-making institution at the village level was the village government.6 Most women who participated in our focus group discussions felt they were sufficiently represented in village decision-making bodies, could influence village decisions and participated actively in village meetings.
Rice is the main staple food and is cultivated mainly in SERU1 and SERU4 because arable land in SERU2 and SERU3 is limited due to frequent flooding. Villages also received subsidized rice as part of a national government program called Raskin (Beras Miskin/Rice for the poor). A hectare of good quality agricultural land ranges from USD 165/ha to USD 440/ha, depending on road access, agricultural productivity and risk of flooding.7 In 2010, rice production dropped in SERU1 because of high rainfall that flooded many rice cultivation areas. The production of fish, the main source of protein, also fell in SERU2 and SERU4 in 2010. Key informants attributed this to increased pollution, loss of forests to oil palm plantations and unsustainable fishing practices (e.g. electrofishing). As a consequence, many fishermen switched livelihoods to seek work in oil palm plantations, which is considered to be less vulnerable to weather variability.
Communities had mixed feelings about oil palm plantations. All study villages had at least one oil palm company operating in their village territory but outside Rimba Raya’s PMZ. According to key informants, these plantations brought important benefits such as jobs, training for forest fire awareness and handy-craft production, and donated 200 liters of fuel every three months to support the village electricity generator. Key informants in all our study villages confirmed that oil palm plantations converted mostly secondary forest lands, resulting in high rates of deforestation outside of the PMZ. In three of the four study villages, land compensation payments led to conflict among some households, and between some households and the oil palm plantations.
The majority of households in two study villages worked in wage labor in oil palm companies, and forests were not important sources of income. In one study village, the main income during our first survey in 2011 was fishing. This shifted to oil palm labor when we visited in 2013. The main source of livelihood in the remaining study village was roughly split between working in oil palm plantations on the east side of the Seruyan River and fishing on the west side (within Rimba Raya’s PMZ). Rubber tapping was another important income source for all study villages except SERU3, which was prone to flooding. Logging was an important source of income until a law against illegal logging was passed in 2005 (GoI 2005). Small-scale logging continued mainly to supply timber for local needs such as for house construction, fencing, fishing equipment, making boats and (in one study village) fuel wood.
20.4 Challenges facing the initiative
There is tremendous pressure in Central Kalimantan to reclassify many state forest areas into other land-use zones in which oil palm plantations are permitted. In some cases, oil palm permits have already been issued by district governments in state forest areas. Rimba Raya’s CAA overlapped with planned oil palm concessions owned by four companies (Bolick et al. 2011, 13). Hence, Rimba Raya’s ERC request highlighted that MoFor’s authority to manage state forest lands and the district head’s actions of issuing oil palm permits over the same area are at odds with each other in the field.
MoFor’s decision to grant an ERC license that only partially covered the CAA was a serious blow for Rimba Raya. As required by its methodology, Rimba Raya must continue to have user rights over the entire CAA over the life of the initiative. To secure rights over the remaining CAA areas, Rimba Raya made agreements with various entities with pre-existing land management rights in those areas. For VCS and CCBA, these agreements satisfied their ‘rights of use’ criteria, leading to the verification of carbon credits. A letter by MoFor that acknowledged Rimba Raya’s plans to implement ecosystem restoration activities across the PMZ covered by those various agreements (Badan Planologi Kehutanan 2013) was used as a basis for Rimba Raya’s claim for rights of use. However, Greenomics, an Indonesian policy development institute, argued that MoFor only approved the area with the ERC license (36,331 ha) (Greenomics 2013). In Greenomics’ view, the letter does not mean MoFor approved Rimba Raya’s initiative throughout the 64,000 ha of the PMZ (which includes the carbon crediting zone), and questioned the legal basis for claiming rights to carbon credits generated from this area.
This case illustrates the difference between rights of use underpinning benefits and liabilities related to REDD+ implementation as defined by carbon certification bodies such as VCS, and legal rights to manage forest as defined by MoFor. Rights of use by VCS can be established through various approaches, including securing rights granted by a national authority such as MoFor (in the case of ERC) or the district head, and contractual agreements with entities with rights to emit GHGs (e.g. converting forest to oil palm) (VCS 2011b, 15). This may not be aligned with national regulations. From the perspective of national regulations, a 2012 ministerial decree (see MoFor 2012a) is the only regulation we are aware of that specifies who has the right to benefit from sales of carbon credits. It states that forest carbon proponents (penyelenggara karbon hutan) have rights to sell or not sell forest carbon under their management. They are defined as entities that hold a forest concession/utilization license (e.g. ERC license) or managers of conservation forests (e.g. TPNP administration). Additionally, the regulation governing whether national parks can enter into agreements with a private entity for forest carbon-related activities has not yet been formulated. Viewing these arrangements as a whole, it is unclear to us how contractual agreements with TPNP, oil palm companies and the district government fit into this regulatory framework. Hence, although Rimba Raya has secured the rights of use from VCS’s perspective, whether it fits the requirements as a forest carbon proponent according to national regulations needs to be further explored.
20.5 Lessons from the initiative
The Rimba Raya initiative – more so than any other case in our sample – is strongly oriented toward excluding outside claimants (oil palm companies) on forests it aims to protect. This makes sense given the large area of land claimed by these outside actors, and the minimal pressure on forests exerted by local households. This case study illustrates the discrepancy between, on the one hand, community-level benefit sharing highlighted in carbon standards such as CCBA and international discourses on FPIC, and on the other hand, the fact that such benefit sharing is not necessary for effectively reducing emissions when large-scale actors play a much more important role than the community in driving carbon emissions.
The protracted permitting process in 2010–2013 limited Rimba Raya from engaging with communities. In 2011–2012, key informants in study communities said Rimba Raya did not implement any interventions. They were informed by PT. RRC staff that this was due to difficulties in obtaining the ERC permit. After the ERC license was issued in 2013, activities in the communities increased. But during the same period, VCS verified that 10 million tCO2e were avoided. This is because Rimba Raya’s methodology clearly states that it is applicable for preventing deforestation by large-scale actors, and not by communities.
This illustrates the possible tradeoffs between equity and efficiency in the specific VCS methodology Rimba Raya is using, and REDD+ in general. Restrictions on forest use planned by Rimba Raya may conceivably have negative livelihood implications for local people because it limits their forest access and rights to change land uses, including to oil palm. Yet, having a positive impact on community livelihoods is not necessary to generate verifiable emission reductions. Rimba Raya has argued they benefit local communities by protecting forests, which allows communities to continue their traditional way of life (Lang 2013). However, it is not evident that this is seen as a benefit in those villages, since three of our four study villages mostly relied on wage labor from oil palm. If so, PT. RRC needs to consider opportunity costs incurred by communities from foregone employment in oil palm in their benefit sharing and community engagement strategies.
We are grateful for the kindness and generosity of the key informants, survey respondents, guides and residents of the villages we studied and the staff at Seruyan District’s Dewan Adat Dayak Kabupaten Seruyan (Dayak Customary Council), District Forestry Services, Badan Lingkungan Hidup (District Environmental Agency), Dinas Pertanian (District Agricultural Services), Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan (District Marine and Fisheries Services), Balai Taman Nasional Tanjung Puting (Tanjung Puting National Park Office) and World Education. Merlinta Anggilia and Mella Komalasari ensured that data were entered correctly. We would also like to thank our reviewers (Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Jim Procanik and Agus Djoko Ismanto) for their useful comments.
1 Also known as InfiniteEARTH‐Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve Project or Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve REDD Project.
2 The methodology requires that, “the original project boundary is fixed over the project life. Even if unforeseen circumstances arise within the project boundary such as deforestation, degradation, fire, or other land use change, the project boundary cannot be shifted.” (VCS 2010, 7).
3 Rencana tata ruang dan wilayah, or RTRW, is a participatory spatial planning process. It starts at the local level and is then proposed to the central government. The provincial spatial plan should reflect the aspiration of each district’s spatial plan within the province. The latest draft for Central Kalimantan was published in a 2003 provincial regulation (Government of Central Kalimantan 2003).
4 Authors’ estimate based on the list of 1998 non-tax income (Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak) (See GoI 1998): IDR 50,000/ha x 36,331 ha x 3 periods (life of concession) = IDR 5,449,650,000, or USD 0.5 million (USD 1 = IDR 10,461). One period is 20 years.
5 Gemor bark is harvested by felling and then debarking the tree. The tree coppices after felling.
6 See the chapter on KFCP (Chapter 17) for a description of village institutional structure, as it is generally the same across Central Kalimantan.
7 Throughout this section, we use the 2010 exchange rate at 2010 prices, USD 1 = IDR 9090 (World Bank 2014).