In the Peruvian Amazon, a company – community partnership is attempting to enhance the livelihood strategies of Brazil nut producers and provide incentives to maintain the forest on which they depend. The initiative, called the REDD Project in Brazil Nut Concessions in Madre de Dios, Peru, was initiated by the company Bosques Amazonicos SAC (BAM) in partnership with the Federation of Brazil nut producers of Madre de Dios (FEPROCAMD). BAM is a private, for-profit, company established in 2004 and dedicated to the conservation, protection, restoration and sustainable management of tropical forests. The company believes that private capital can play a key role in developing a sustainable world. FEPROCAMD is the principal organization representing nut collectors in the region. Brazil nut production supports forest conservation because Brazil nuts are only produced by trees that grow in native forests with an intact forest canopy (Ortiz 2002). In 2009 BAM signed a partnership contract with FEPROCAMD. Under the contract, in exchange for carbon rights to 405 Brazil nut concessions, BAM provides participating producers with technical and financial support and a share of profits from carbon offset sales. BAM is also building a Brazil nut processing plant that will be managed by staff hired by the shareholders board, which includes representatives of BAM and the producers. In 2012, the initiative was validated under the VCS and in 2014, it was certified by the CCBA. While still not fully underway, the initiative provides an innovative example of approaches to REDD+ involving the private sector and forest producers in a threatened, biodiverse region.

8.1 Basic facts: Where, who, why and when

8.1.1 Geography

This REDD+ initiative is located in the Madre de Dios region, situated in the Peruvian Amazon (Figure 8.1). Madre de Dios is the third largest region in Peru with an area of 85,300 km2 (Hajek et al. 2011). The initiative is located in the Tahuamanu and Tambopata provinces and straddles the Inter-Oceanic Highway connecting Brazil to the Pacific coast.

Madre de Dios is hot and humid. According to the Köppen classification, the regional climate is tropical monsoon, which is characterized by a short dry season. The average annual temperature is 26°C, but can range from of 38°C to 10°C for short periods during the dry season (June–August) (Rasanen 1993; Barthem et al. 2003). Annual precipitation varies from 1600 to 2400 mm.

The topography of Madre de Dios is generally characterized by undulating and moderately undulating terrain interspersed with level floodplains. Regional soils are characteristically alluvial and nutrient poor. The most widespread types of vegetation in the initiative zone are semi-deciduous dense forests on plains (58.11%), semi-deciduous dense forests on hills (14.16%) and mixed bamboo communities associated with scattered trees on plains (9.87%) (BAM 2014). The initiative focuses on forests rich in Brazil nuts (Bertholletia excelsa), the most important NTFP in the region (Duchelle et al. 2012). The Brazil nut fruits fall during the wet season and are collected between January and March. These forests are also rich in valuable timber species, which are harvested both legally and illegally.

The economic history of Madre de Dios has been dominated by natural resource extraction. The rubber boom in the late nineteenth century motivated early colonization of the region. However, the collapse of rubber prices in 1912 brought economic stagnation and the adoption of diversified livelihood strategies that included Brazil nuts and agriculture (Fifer 1970; Barham and Coomes 1996; Stoian 2000; Duchelle et al. 2011). Alluvial gold mining began drawing migrants in the 1930s from the highlands, a process that accelerated in the 1970s (Morcillo 1982).

The 1969 agrarian reform significantly shaped the landscape of Madre de Dios. Under President Velasco Alvarado’s military populist regime (1968–1975), Peru underwent a set of structural reforms aimed at eradicating the power of the traditional elite and fostering a more cooperative society (Mar and Mejia 1980). In Madre de Dios, this meant dismantling the forest latifundios (estates) and the redistribution of land to workers. The redistribution process was further driven by the arrival of landless migrants using an unpaved highway constructed in the mid-1960s linking the Andean highlands to Puerto Maldonado (Dourojeanni 2006).

Despite these reforms, Madre de Dios continued to be largely ignored by the central government until the first administration of Alan Garcia (1985–1990) (Chavez 2009). Two especially notable policies implemented during this time were credit and cattle expansion policies. Thousands of colonists from the highlands were enticed to settle in Madre de Dios to clear forest and cultivate small landholdings (Alvarez and Naughton-Treves 2003; Naughton-Treves 2004). Prosperity was short-lived, however, and following the election of Fujimori in 1990, the Peruvian government closed the Agrarian Bank, halting agricultural credit and subsidies. Studies show that during this period, lands along the Interoceanic Highway were abandoned and forest clearing declined in Madre de Dios (Alvarez and Naughton-Treves 2003; Naughton-Treves 2004). Inadequate financing opportunities have remained a limiting factor to agricultural expansion and intensification in the region, resulting in low productivity and yield (INRENA 2003).

The Peruvian Forestry and Wildlife Law of 2000 (No. 27308), implemented in 2002, established 40-year concessions for timber and NTFPs (SPDA-INRENA 2003). As of 2011, Brazil nut concessions (25–4000 ha units) covered 10.5% of Madre de Dios. Although intended primarily for Brazil nut production, concessionaires can present complementary plans for other forest uses. A 2004 decree allowed timber harvests up to 5 m3/ha in Brazil nut concessions, but was rescinded in 2007 (Peña 2010). Timber extraction continues, however, and in 2009 and 2010 the volume of wood from Brazil nut concessions exceeded that from timber concessions in the region (Cossío-Solano et al. 2011).

Madre de Dios is the least populated region of Peru with a population of 109,555 inhabitants in 2007, 27% of whom live in rural areas (INEI 2012). The capital, Puerto Maldonado, accounts for more than half of this total (67,632 inhabitants in 2007) and forms the epicenter of the region. With the recently paved (2010) Interoceanic Highway passing through Puerto Maldonado, connecting Peru to Brazil and Bolivia, the city has experienced unprecedented growth (INEI 2012). In 2007, 39.8% of the region’s population was born outside Madre de Dios (GOREMAD 2013); many people born there were descendants of migrant families (INRENA 2003). The total population in the initiative zone, in terms of communities and scattered populations, was 7119 inhabitants in 2007 (BAM 2014).

According to BAM, the main drivers of deforestation in the initiative zone are small-scale cattle ranching (51.8%), mixed small-scale agriculture and cattle ranching (39%), mining (3.6%), subsistence agriculture (3.3%), and human settlements (2.3%). Most deforestation has occurred near roads, rivers and towns. The main driver of forest degradation is legal and illegal timber harvesting at multiple scales (AIDER 2013b).

The six most populated communities within the initiative zone are all located on or near the Interoceanic Highway; they are Planchon, Alegria, Mavila, Alerta, La Novia and Shiringayoc. In our study we focused on the Brazil nut concessions surrounding three of these communities and concessions near one intervention community only accessible by river. We sampled approximately 30 concessions at each site (MDD1=31; MDD2=31; MDD3=30; MDD4=33).

8.1.2 Stakeholders and funding

BAM was founded on the belief that high returns for investors are possible through the efficient management of forests, the development of the economic potential of the Amazon region, and integration of the Amazon region into international markets (BAM 2012a). BAM generates revenues from two main sources: the sale of carbon emission offsets under VCS guidelines and the sale of certified high-value timber (tropical hardwoods) from its reforestation projects.

Initially BAM funded the REDD+ initiative internally and all documents related to carbon certification were produced in-house. BAM hired external consultants to establish a carbon baseline, interpret satellite images and conduct carbon inventories. Once the initiative was VCS-validated in 2012, approximately 1.5 million verified carbon units (VCUs) were sold to four clients (the majority negotiated with BioCarbon Group Pte Limited for 1,116,504 VCUs) but the sale has covered costs and no direct payments have yet been received by concessionaires.

BAM initially collaborated with Conservación Ambiental y Desarrollo en el Perú (CAMDE) from 2009 to 2011. CAMDE was a key player in establishing the joint venture and strategic partnership between BAM and FEPROCAMD. CAMDE delimited the Brazil nut concessions and helped with concession documents but these responsibilities were later transferred to FEPROCAMD.

8.1.3 Motivation

While Brazil nuts have provided significant income for decades, given Madre de Dios’ history of boom-bust economic cycles, economic diversification is a high priority. Alternatives that do not undercut existing forest production systems are attractive. Without adequate support, BAM projects that 107,981 ha of forest will be lost by 2040, representing 34.9% of the total intervention area (BAM 2014).

8.1.4 Timeline

The REDD Project in Brazil Nut Concessions was initiated on 24 September 2009 with the signing of the framework contract between BAM and FEPROCAMD for its joint development. Figure 8.2 summarizes key events related to the initiative.

8.2 Strategy for the initiative

The aim of the initiative is to reduce deforestation (RED), reduce degradation (second D), and promote forest conservation and management (+). BAM strives to empower Brazil nut concessionaires to protect their land and livelihoods not only through incentives derived from commercialization of carbon but also through co-benefits including stronger tenure rights, added value for timber and NTFPs through certification, and healthier, more productive forests.

The initiative is presently verified under both the VCS1 and CCBA2 standards, the latter having achieved a biodiversity gold level. The VCS crediting period commenced on 1 January 2010 and will continue for 31 years. Reference levels have been established over the entire initiative zone based on deforestation data from 2000 to 2008 generated in collaboration with Carbon Decision International and AIDER (Asociación para la investigación y el desarrollo integral). The deforestation model was generated with support from other institutions through the Madre de Dios REDD+ consortium and will serve as a regional baseline for all subnational REDD+ initiatives in the region.

The initiative’s consultation process followed a protocol that included coordination meetings with local leaders and officials, media broadcasts, and events to distribute promotional materials. Moreover, a public dialogue was held through mainstream media to include stakeholders in the Brazil nut sector. During 2009 and 2010, BAM organized meetings in Puerto Maldonado and in communities along the Interoceanic Highway to ensure FPIC and clarify specific concerns expressed by Brazil nut concessionaires.

In 2009, BAM signed an agreement with FEPROCAMD whereby the Federation ceded to BAM the environmental services and carbon commercialization rights of the participating concessions. The main points within the agreement include BAM agreeing to invest at least USD 1 million in nut commercialization activities largely through construction of the Brazil nut processing plant and revenue distribution from the sale of carbon credits (70% to BAM, 30% to the signed concessionaires). This umbrella agreement allowed FEPROCAMD to sign individual contracts with interested Brazil nut concessionaires whereby individuals would concede their rights to sell environmental services and carbon from the concession, and FEPROCAMD then concedes these same rights to BAM.

Participation in the initiative is open and BAM is willing to accept new Brazil nut concessionaires. Since achieving VCS validation in 2012, the initiative has grown from 377 to 405 concessionaires. The protocol to accept new concessionaires first requires proof of concession rights and full compliance with concession requirements. Further requirements include signing the REDD+ contract with FEPROCAMD; knowledge and acceptance of the long-term agreement conditions between the federation and BAM; not having signed a contract on carbon rights with other companies; and, in the case of timber extraction, agreement to abide by FSC certification requirements to continue logging.

In return for participation in the initiative, the concessionaires will receive the following benefits: (i) access to benefits from implementation of the Brazil nut processing plant; (ii) capital to cover initial costs during the nut harvesting season; (iii) assistance with submission of documents required to maintain control over their concessions; and (iv) income from the sale of carbon offsets. Incentives based on securing nut concessions and livelihoods are largely geared towards discouraging the expansion of the agricultural frontier for annual crops and/or cattle, as these were identified as the main drivers of deforestation (responsible for 98% of the projected site leakage).

Brazil nut concessionaires are legally allowed to use 1–2 ha within their concession for farming, but are not permitted to cut primary forest, only secondary regrowth. Since the nut concessions cannot be used as collateral, it is difficult for concessionaires to obtain loans and implement higher value agricultural activities (i.e. farming with machinery, investment in cash crops, intensification of cattle, etc.) within the concession and in other areas. Therefore, they are often trapped in a system of low intensity, shifting cultivation. As such, the initiative approach is to increase concessionaires’ incomes by adding value through Brazil nut processing and exportation. The exact manner in which concessionaires will receive income from the nut processing plant has yet to be determined (i.e. whether there will be full reinvestment back into the plant or whether concessionaires will receive dividends from the net profit).

Apart from this initiative, the nut concessionaires receive little support from other organizations, either in cash or in kind. Candela Peru offers organic certification but rather than paying a price premium, they only provide a secure market for the product. Several governments and NGOs offer reforestation assistance, often as agroforestry systems, but typically only near to roads. Projects have also attempted to improve Brazil nut production and commercialization but these are usually limited to short training courses in the use of donated drying equipment. No initiative stakeholder mentioned that such developmental support had deterred their participation in the REDD+ initiative.

8.3 Smallholders in the initiative

The intervention area of the initiative, comprising 405 Brazil nut concessions over 308,757 ha, is within a broader initiative zone of 1,015,316 ha (BAM 2012b) that includes a leakage belt. This broader zone includes more than 600 nonparticipating Brazil nut concessions as well as adjacent agricultural land, mining areas and other forestry concessions.

Initially BAM thought that concessionaires would enter the initiative through agglomerations of smaller producer associations, which would then form part of FEPROCAMD. Not all association members, however, agreed to participate in the REDD+ initiative. Moreover, FEPROCAMD and BAM have since decided to allow independent concessionaires to sign onto the initiative without first affiliating themselves to an association. Consequently, BAM works directly with individuals who volunteer to participate in the initiative and, as such, there is no congruous implementation area.

For our study, we sampled 126 Brazil nut concessionaires from four communities participating in the REDD+ initiative. It is worth noting that concessionaires do not always live within clearly defined communities, but often maintain several residences within their concession, in a larger community near their concession, or in the regional capital of Puerto Maldonado.

To define sample communities in this context, we first selected Brazil nut producer associations with greater than 80% participation in the REDD+ initiative and affiliation with FEPROCAMD, thereby ensuring an organized core to allow for group meetings. Unfortunately, low rates of registered membership in FEPROCAMD meant that there were often less than 30 households per association. Thus, we added concessionaires from the same geographical location to the respective association lists (i.e. non-affiliated concessionaires around MDD1 were added to the member list of the MDD1 association). The selected intervention communities included three located along the Interoceanic Highway (MDD1, MDD2, MDD3) and a fourth (MDD4) along the Rio Pariamanu/Pariamarca River. MDD4 differs from the other communities in that there is no physical village within the site and the majority of concessionaries opt to live in Puerto Maldonado and travel to their concessions during the harvest season. As such, association activities are conducted in Puerto Maldonado. Study sampling was carried out between October 2011 and January 2012.

In the study communities, local institutions were present but governance was weak. Apart from Brazil nut producer associations, most communities had associations of farmers, cattle ranchers and loggers; the exception was MDD4, which only had a Brazil nut association. In all communities, the nut association was identified as the most important decision-making unit in the community with its members elected by their constituents. In three of the four communities, the majority of women were reported as being sufficiently represented in important community decision-making bodies and participated actively in meetings, but their influence on community decisions was mainly through influencing their husbands.

Nearly three-quarters of the Brazil nut concessionaires interviewed were not born in their respective community (Table 8.1). Most migrated from the Peruvian highlands around Cusco, Arequipa or Puno during either the agrarian reform or the first administration of Alan Garcia.

MDD1-3 reported year-round road access from Puerto Maldonado to the community center, but not for access to their concessions. Transportation on these smaller, unpaved roads is very difficult during the rainy season with access often restricted to motorcycles; some concessionaires opt to live permanently in their concessions during this season. The limited transportation also restricted the sale of agricultural produce, and consequently almost all production was for household consumption. Rice was the main staple in all four communities and was the crop with the highest production value except in the river community (MDD4) where cassava predominated, probably because it is less labor intensive. In three communities, Brazil nuts were reported to have become more important in the two years prior to the survey (2009–2011). Producers consistently cited an increase in nut price as the reason for its increased importance, and indeed 2011 witnessed an extremely high price for this product. Certain cash crops such as watermelon, oranges, pineapple and copoazu (Theobroma grandiflorum) were identified as being more important in certain communities, but these changes were almost always associated with a small-scale project being implemented by either an NGO or government agency.

The difference between MDD1-3 and MDD4 partly reflects the presence of infrastructure: MDD1-3 offered local health care services and education to secondary school level. In MDD4, since most concessionaires resided in Puerto Maldonado most of the year, they enjoyed an array of services offered by a larger city, including a university. No community had access to banks or formal credit, which concessionaires often identified as an impediment to improving their productive systems.

Household incomes were high in 2011, but this result may reflect the extremely high price offered for Brazil nuts that year (Table 8.2). Average community income is strongly related to the average concession size; larger nut concessions typically have more trees and thus generate more income. In terms of education, household members typically studied for eight years, except in MDD4 where they studied on average for an additional year. This is perhaps reflective of the better educational opportunities offered in the city as opposed to the smaller communities. In terms of health, household members (≥ 16 years old) were typically ill 6.7 to 7.2 days over the 12 months prior to the survey. The average was slightly higher in MDD2 (9.1 days) and may reflect its increased distance from the city. Most households had electricity and a private latrine in their principle residence, but typically only half of the households had piped water.

A summary of household income from different activities across all communities clearly shows that Brazil nut concessionaires’ livelihoods in 2011 were largely based on forest products (Figure 8.3). Household businesses were the second most important source of income, except in MDD4 where wage labor comprised a larger share. This is perhaps because concessionaires in MDD4 had greater access to wage labor in the city compared to other communities. In all four communities, households were minimally reliant on agriculture and animal income (Figure 8.4). Concessionaires remarked that when nut productivity and prices were high, as they were in 2011, producers tended to focus more heavily on nut collection and less on agricultural production. During the community and household surveys, few respondents acknowledged receiving support from the government in the form of a pension or remittances from family members (other income, Figure 8.3).

As Brazil nut producers, local livelihoods depend largely upon the productivity of forests. Contractually, if concessionaires fail to maintain the trails within their concessions or fail to harvest their nuts, they risk having their concessionary rights revoked by the regional government. This obligation is evident in Table 8.3, where nearly 100% of households in all communities report selling forest products.

Data from 2011 also show that forest products were mostly for sale and not for household consumption. Most forest income was derived from Brazil nuts and timber. In MDD1, MDD2 and MDD3, Brazil nuts generate more than two-thirds of forest income, while in MDD4, timber was more important, generating 55% of forest income. Brazil nut concessionaires derived proportionally very little income from other NTFPs in their concessions or products such as bushmeat, fish or medicinal plants.

Households were asked about changes in their collection of NTFPs and fuelwood. Across all communities, respondents remarked that their reliance on fuelwood decreased, as concessionaires preferred to bring gas with them to their concessions. Since the nut harvest coincides with the rainy season, it complicates the use of fuelwood while in concession camps. When gas was not available, respondents preferred charcoal for its rapid ignition and easier storage. Outside of the harvest season, many nut producers lived in larger populated centers where fuelwood was scarce. This explains why typically only half of respondents in each community identified fuelwood or charcoal as a primary cooking source throughout the year. Respondents also remarked that the use of palm leaves for roof thatching had been steadily decreasing since the Interoceanic Highway was paved and the availability and price of corrugated iron roofing improved. These factors explain why the reported household consumption of forest products declined in nearly one-quarter of all households surveyed.

The restriction on cultivation within the concession was evident in the average area of mature and secondary forest cleared in the past two years (Table 8.3). Concessionaires generally did not deforest more than 0.5–1.0 ha in a two-year period, with clearing generally associated with cropping or pasture creation. Nevertheless, when asked whether forest cover within the concessions had changed in the past two years, participants in every community survey indicated that forest cover had decreased. Participants typically associated forest cover loss with increased immigration (three communities) or small-scale forestry (two communities). Some nut concessionaires, particularly those located near the Interoceanic Highway and with natural irrigation sources, sell parcels of land within their concession for agricultural uses. Although this practice is illegal, the government does not have the capacity to control it. All four communities identified a decrease in forest quality in the past two years and attributed this decrease to climate change (four communities) and over-exploitation of resources (two communities).

8.4 Challenges facing the initiative

We documented a variety of challenges and concerns raised by different stakeholders. One of the greatest challenges facing the initiative is unclear land tenure rights and chaotic zoning, resulting in overlapping land rights in the initiative zone.

Most concessionaires have overlapping boundaries because coordinates were registered by different entities (often NGOs or independent forest consultants), and the Regional Forestry Direction failed to verify the final boundaries. The overlaps result in conflict between neighboring concessions, occasionally with violent consequences. While this conflict does not represent a risk to the forest (and associated carbon stocks), it undermines confidence in the concession system. In addition, unclaimed gaps between concessions have allowed other actors to solicit land titles. Resolution of the problems of imprecise boundaries and overlapping claims, and the success of REDD+ in Madre de Dios, will hinge upon cooperation between the ministries to eliminate multiuse land zoning (Chavez et al. 2012). It will also depend upon better nut concession management on the part of the Regional Forestry Directive to eliminate land conflicts within the Brazil nut zone.

The recent gold rush in Madre de Dios has also spurred considerable land conflicts within the region. Although the initiative lies largely to the north of the mining zone, a fraction of the initiative zone (2.9% or 8053 ha) has overlapping rights with mining concessions. Moreover, respondents anecdotally remarked that nut concessionaires often illegally invite miners into their concessions for a percentage of their profit. Nevertheless, BAM does not consider the scale of this practice to be a considerable threat to initiative implementation.

Another concern raised by local NGOs is how to control timber extraction within the Brazil nut concessions. Data obtained from the household surveys demonstrated that nearly 60% of households surveyed in the four communities extract timber from within their Brazil nut concessions. Of those, an average of 666 m³ was extracted per concessionaire in 2011, 98% of which was sold. The average household net income from this activity was USD 6261. To provide some perspective, the lowest paid worker in an informal mine earns USD 700/month while local agricultural wages average USD 100–150 /month (USAID 2010). Thus, timber is nearly as lucrative as mining, far less detrimental health-wise and therefore may become a potentially difficult livelihood activity for BAM to manage in the future.

The limited knowledge of the REDD+ initiative by participants in 2011 was also of concern. Prior to our surveys, BAM conducted workshops and training sessions and offered technical and legal assistance to participants, including small loans. Nevertheless, of the 126 participating households interviewed, only 62% reported that they knew about the REDD+ initiative; their main source of information about the initiative was first NGOs and then the proponent.

We asked the 62% of households (n = 78) that expressed a basic knowledge about the initiative about their concerns and recommendations. Their main concerns were that the initiative would not adequately compensate them for the loss of forest income (10 households), that it would not be implemented (9 households) and that concessionaires would lose their land rights (6 households). These concerns were largely attributable to unaddressed misunderstandings or unfounded rumors generated within communities. Unrealistic outcomes may have been communicated to the concessionaires during the preliminary phases of the initiative to encourage participation. Households’ main recommendations focused on BAM upholding their contractual obligations (16 households), primarily the construction of the nut processing plant. Participants also recommended more technical workshops (12 households) as they desired greater understanding of the REDD+ initiative, as well as technical support in concession management. Finally, they recommended improving communication and transparency (9 households) by holding more workshops in the communities, visiting the concessionaires in their concessions and providing more details on the cost of initiative implementation.

8.5 Lessons from the initiative

The REDD+ Project in Brazil Nut Concessions in Madre de Dios offers unique insights for initiatives being implemented by private entities. The challenges confronted by BAM, particularly with regard to poor land tenure regularization and unclear carbon commercialization rights, are problems which are customarily only resolved by the State but which a private entity such as BAM can learn to strategically mitigate to achieve REDD+ success.

BAM has been particularly successful in collaborating with government institutions within the initiative zone and in contributing to conditions for the implementation of all REDD+ initiatives within Madre de Dios. BAM currently participates in the cross-sectoral REDD+ working group – the Mesa REDD – which has 60+ institutional members at the national level. They also work with the regional REDD+ Working Group in Madre de Dios, where public-private partners discuss and agree on technical methods. They are thereby contributing to the technical capacity of the regional government as well as cost-sharing and ensuring better consistency between various REDD+ implementing entities.

The initiative also offers a unique opportunity to examine a system where income generated from NTFPs could potentially sustain household needs and discourage conversion of these forests for other land uses. While Brazil nuts comprised a large share of household income in 2011, this may be driven by the high prices of Brazil nuts that year. Prices have greatly varied in the past and are likely to do so in the future, warning against excessive reliance on this source of income. While the Brazil nut processing plant is a popular aspect of the initiative among producers, it will be a challenge to operate and it is not clear how it will overcome price fluctuations driven by international commodity markets.

The initiative can also provide invaluable lessons on communication with local stakeholders. BAM tried to reach the widest audience possible by diffusing information through various means. Despite their best efforts, however, it emerges that outreach was not always sufficient to avoid a sense of uncertainty and confusion. Ultimately, Brazil nut producers have been the recipients of many short-term projects that brought very little sustained improvement to their overall livelihoods. They have also collaborated with many researchers who have extracted information without adequately explaining the purpose of their work. Consequently, they have become skeptical of such outside actors, and their interest in new initiatives is low. BAM expects local participation to increase once major initiative activities are underway, such as the sustained sale of carbon credits, finalization of the Brazil nut processing plant, and the implementation of the monitoring and surveillance system. It will be interesting to observe whether participants’ concerns dissipate or transform into new concerns after these goals are achieved, and how BAM reacts to these local concerns in the long-term.

8.6 Acknowledgments

We are particularly indebted to the Brazil nut concessionaires of Madre de Dios and their families for sharing with us their time, knowledge and laughter. We’d also like to thank Bosques Amazonicos for always being exceptionally forthcoming with project information and for their agreement to work with us in the intervention area. Finally, we’d like to thank the members of the Madre de Dios field team for their dedication to this research study: Veronica Huamani Briceño, Anggela Michi Quijano, Mariella Guisa, Frank Varela Tito and Ronny Fernandez Menis.