This chapter discusses implementation of one of the first REDD+ initiatives in Vietnam, designed and implemented by SNV (the Netherlands Development Organisation).1 This case is framed in the broader context of dynamics between international NGOs and the government of Vietnam (GOV) in the REDD+ arena.

The Cat Loc Landscape – Cat Tien National Park Pro-Poor REDD+ Project2 (2009–2012) was funded by the UK Government Darwin Initiative, and implemented in partnership with the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and national and local authorities in Vietnam. This initiative aimed to (i) examine the potential for accessing the voluntary carbon market in order to reduce deforestation and (ii) support the establishment of a forest carbon facility to make direct payments to local villagers for arresting degradation and deforestation in and around the Cat Tien National Park, Lam Dong Province. Although the initiative did not end up making payments to local villagers as initially planned, a number of useful lessons were learned.

23.1 Basic facts: Where, who, why and when

23.1.1 Geography

Cat Tien District is located in Lam Dong Province in the Central Highlands of Vietnam (Figure 23.1). Deforestation has been a serious problem in the Central Highlands. Agricultural expansion has long been a driver of deforestation in Lam Dong Province, with records dating back to 1958 suggesting trends toward land conversion in several districts. Comparisons of land-use maps in 1979 also suggest that areas such as the Cat Tien District, which did not have permanently cultivated fields, saw significant changes in agricultural cultivation techniques during the early 1980s. Maps for 1992 also show the retreat of large forests (excluding bamboo) and the continued expansion of cultivated land (Koninck 1999).

8852.jpg

Figure 23.1 Map of the REDD+ initiative in Cat Tien.

Data sources: SNV, GADM, OpenStreetMap and World Ocean Base.

Established in 1987, the Cat Tien District is the ancestral home to the Chau Ma and Xtieng ethnic groups. It is a ‘special land’ where the ancient kingdom of the South was founded. Cat Tien National Park (CTNP) is one of Vietnam’s most important and largest national parks, covering 71,920 ha of lowland forest and swamp. The park is well known for once being the habitat of the Javan rhinoceros (officially declared extinct in Vietnam in 2010).

23.1.2 Stakeholders and funding

In 2009, SNV conceptualized a pilot REDD+ initiative, targeting the voluntary carbon market and seeking sustainable financing mechanisms for communities, as an effort to curb forest degradation and contribute to the conservation of the Javan rhino in Cat Tien. The initiative received a Darwin grant of GBP 188,624 for a period of three years, 2009–2012. It was carried out in close partnership with IIED, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and Lam Dong provincial and district authorities in Vietnam.

23.1.3 Motivation

SNV’s success with biogas projects3 and its involvement in setting up CDM methodologies has been widely recognized in Vietnam. In 2004, SNV found that through the use of the CDM, reforestation would become a source of income for communities.4 The Cat Tien initiative aimed to examine the potential for avoided deforestation through accessing the voluntary carbon market and to support the establishment of a forest carbon facility to compensate local villagers for arresting degradation and deforestation in and around CTNP. It also intended to support pro-poor REDD+ polices and measures to enable communities to receive support from carbon markets through participatory village-level emissions reduction planning.

23.1.4 Timeline

The initiative’s key activities, as outlined in Figure 23.2, were primarily in the realm of ‘readiness,’ including development of methods for participatory forest carbon measurement and design of benefit-sharing systems.

figure%2023%202.jpg

Figure 23.2 Timeline of the REDD+ initiative in Cat Tien.

As seen in Figure 23.2, after the project was approved in 2009, a technical working group on REDD+ at the provincial level was established and immediately became active. The activities in early 2010 revolved around developing baseline data, including maps, key drivers of deforestation and socioeconomic profiles of the villages within the boundary of the initiative. Later in 2010, the first field activities that involved local villagers took place: training and piloting participatory forest carbon measurement. In 2011, SNV joined forces with UN-REDD to study benefit distribution systems (BDS), carrying out extensive consultations with communities and suggesting the establishment of a community management board for any REDD+ funds. The initiative was completed in 2012 with a number of key policy recommendations on REDD+ financing of a BDS and participatory forest carbon measurement.

23.2 Strategy for the initiative

The Cat Tien initiative was endorsed in 2009 by the Lam Dong provincial People’s Committee with a local government partner, the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD). To facilitate broader participation, DARD established a provincial REDD+ technical working group, which served as a forum for local government stakeholders to develop technical capacities for and strengthen political ownership of initiative implementation and outputs. SNV’s field activities were carried out in two areas of the Cat Tien and Bao Lam Districts.

In 2010, among a number of studies commissioned by SNV, an in-depth financial and technical analysis indicated that the project approach was unsustainable because of factors such as technical challenges, uncertainty over market maturity and high implementation and opportunity costs. Consequently, the initiative was reoriented to focus on developing models to inform potential future public sector funding for REDD+ in Vietnam. SNV decided to discontinue pursuit of the voluntary market and switched to target interim public financing as a source of forest carbon revenue to compensate local communities for their participation and performance in REDD+ activities.

The Cat Tien initiative benefited from a technical partnership with the United States Forest Service in the field of participatory forest monitoring, operational system design and participatory carbon monitoring (PCM) methods and protocols via the Lowering Emissions in Asia’s Forests (LEAF) project, funded by USAID. A few training courses and participatory forest monitoring activities were carried out in Tien Hoang commune. However, the final project report stated that due to “inaccessible or non-existent REDD+ markets and funds”, there were no flows of financing to communities, and that participatory village-level emissions reduction planning was “deemed an unviable and high-risk activity, which had potential to unreasonably raise local expectations from putative REDD+ schemes” (SNV 2012, 8).

In their report, An Approach to Designing Pro-Poor Local REDD+ Benefit Distribution Systems: Lessons from Vietnam, SNV highlighted the need to examine the legal frameworks both at national and subnational levels to identify areas of complementarity or conflicts with customary laws (Enright et al. 2012). Based on this notion, they developed a proposed process for the determination of REDD+ beneficiaries. The report makes a policy suggestion on forestland tenure and urges the GOV to consider both the REDD+ BDS landscape approach and the carbon rights approach, with great emphasis on participation, transparency and equity.

Apart from SNV’s interventions, the WWF Indochina Program has also been active in CTNP’s core and buffer zones since 1997. The organization implemented a conservation project (1997–2006) focusing on protection of CTNP, reducing human impacts and considering landscape-level strategies to support the management of CTNP. In Cat Tien District, WWF executed a project (2008–2012) with the goal of diversifying landscapes, improving the livelihoods of communities, and contributing to sustainable development in poor rural areas around CTNP through optimized production of cashew, and the introduction of diversified farming and cocoa production. Thus, SNV and WWF shared a common goal to curb deforestation and conserve Cat Tien rhinos.

Cat Tien National Park – “Last refuge for a lost animal”5

In April 2010, a dead Javan rhino was found with a single bullet in its leg and its horn removed. In October 2011, WWF confirmed that the species became extinct in Vietnam. The extinction of the Javan rhino in Vietnam was “definitely a blow” to the conservation communities around the world (BBC News 2011).

Moving away from livelihood improvement and REDD+ payments as initially planned, the Cat Tien initiative served as a way to test new mechanisms and approaches for REDD+ policy formulation. Since the Cat Tien initiative ended in 2012, SNV’s involvement in REDD+ has remained strong in Lam Dong via other REDD+ initiatives. Currently, together with UN-REDD, they are the main supporters in formulating the provincial REDD+ action plan.

23.3 Smallholders in the initiative

23.3.1 Socioeconomic and land-use data

The Cat Tien initiative was implemented in Tien Hoang Commune, Cat Tien District. The commune has six villages with a total of 3245 people, comprised of 70% Kinh6 people and 30% other ethnic minority groups (both local and immigrant). The Kinh and other ethnic minorities were resettled7 in Cat Tien from the northern uplands and the Red River Delta. Of these six villages, four were selected for the CIFOR-GCS sample. A total of 120 households (30 in each village) were interviewed, and surveys of the village and specifically of women in the village were also conducted. The four surveyed villages are located along main roads and in the buffer zone of CTNP. Figure 23.1 shows the locations of the study villages (the red dots) in Cat Tien.

All villagers had access to schools and health centers within the commune. As seen in Table 23.1, most villagers received between seven and nine years of schooling. While none of the villagers had access to piped water and instead used wells for water supply, electricity was accessed by 100% of the surveyed population. The average size of land holding (including agriculture, forestry and residential land) was different among the villages. LDCT1 had the largest land area, with almost four times the average landholding in LDCT3. The survey results also indicate that LDCT1 had the largest secondary forest area. It is interesting to note that approximately 92% of the villagers in LDCT1 thought that their incomes were sufficient, while only 53% of their neighbors in LDCT3 and LDCT4 shared the same opinion. More discussion on incomes is provided in Section 23.3.2.

Table 23.1 Socioeconomic characteristics of households interviewed in 2010.

LDCT1

LDCT2

LDCT3

LDCT4

Number of households sampled

30

30

30

30

Household average (SD)

Number of adults

3.4 (1.4)

3.9 (1.5)

3.7 (1.5)

3.7 (1.8)

Number of members

4.7 (1.5)

4.8 (1.7)

5.0 (1.4)

4.6 (1.7)

Days of illness per adult

9.1 (12.7)

11.2 (16.2)

13.6 (29.3)

18.8 (33.5)

Years of education (adults ≥ 16 years old)

7.4 (3.7)

8.4 (3.6)

8.1 (3.4)

8.9 (3.9)

Total income (USD)a

5,971 (9,629)

2,823 (2,771)

1,920 (2,292)

3,067 (3,645)

Total value of livestock (USD)b

1,413 (820)

1,976 (4,083)

800 (1,518)

665 (684)

Total land controlled (ha)c

9.5 (10.0)

5.4 (5.3)

2.5 (2.7)

5.0 (5.1)

Total value of transportation assets (USD)

617 (740)

380 (512)

441 (662)

458 (614)

Percentage of households with:

Mobile or fixed phone

100

100

100

100

Electricity

100

100

100

100

Piped water supply

0

0

0

0

Private latrine or toilet

100

93

100

93

Perceived sufficient income

93

63

53

53

a Total annual income (12 months prior to survey) from agriculture, livestock, business, wage labor and other sources (remittances, subsidies, pensions), net of costs, in USD; currency converted using yearly average provided by the World Bank.

b Total livestock value at the time of interview.

c Total area of agricultural, forest, other natural habitat and residential areas controlled by the household, either used or rented out.

According to the 2012 commune statistics, more than 95% of the Tien Hoang population earn their living from agricultural and forestry activities. Our survey results (Table 23.2) show that 58%–71% of villagers considered agriculture as their primary or secondary occupation. In contrast, forestry was the primary or secondary occupation of only 9% of villagers in LDCT1, almost 2% in LDCT2 and none of the villagers in LDCT3 and LDCT4, despite their greater proximity to the forests. This is partly explained by the fact that natural forests are owned by the government. The state forest organizations that own the forest sign forest protection contracts with villagers and pay them an annual fee. Natural forest resource extraction or clearing is illegal.

Table 23.2 Indicators of household forest dependence based on the 2010 survey.

LDCT1

LDCT2

LDCT3

LDCT4

Number of households sampled

30

30

30

30

Household average (SD)

Share of income from forest

27.04 (41.26)

2.00 (7.42)

0.03 (0.15)

2.52 (11.55)

Share of income from agriculture

44.09 (41.44)

43.50 (9.45)

48.06 (14.99)

52.14 (37.58)

Area of natural forest cleared (ha)a

0.27 (1.28)

0.22 (0.83)

0.00 (0.00)

0.45 (1.31)

Area of secondary forest cleared (ha)a

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

Area left fallow (ha)b

14.67 (9.24)

13 (0.00)

0.10 (0.00)

1.00 (0.00)

Distance to forests (minutes walking)

30

90

180

120

Percentage of households

With agriculture as a primary or secondary occupation (adults ≥ 16 years old)c

71

63

61

58

With a forest-based primary or secondary occupation (adults ≥ 16 years old)d

9

2

0

0

Reporting increased consumption of forest productse

0

0

0

0

Reporting decreased consumption of forest productse

43

29

14

25

Obtaining cash income from forest productsf

47

27

27

13

Reporting an increase in cash income from forestf

0

0

0

0

Reporting a decrease in cash income from forestf

36

13

0

0

Reporting fuelwood or charcoal as primary cooking source

97

100

87

93

Leaving land fallowg

10

3

3

3

Clearing forestg

10

7

0

13

Reporting decreased opportunity for clearing forestg

50

37

38

22

Clearing land for cropsg

3

0

0

10

Clearing land for pastureg

0

0

0

0

a Average no. of hectares cleared over the past two years among households that reported clearing of any forest.

b Average no. hectares left fallow among households that reported leaving any land fallow.

c Percentage of households with at least one adult reporting cropping as a primary or secondary livelihood.

d Percentage of households with at least one adult reporting forestry as a primary or secondary livelihood.

e Percentage of households among those that reported any consumption of forest products over the past two years.

f Percentage of households among those that reported any cash income from forest products over the past two years.

g In the two years prior to the survey.

Tien Hoang Commune covers a total area of 5237 ha. Forestry land accounts for 60% of the total area. According to SNV’s land-use maps over the two periods 1995–2004 and 2004–2009, it is evident that there was a large increase in the area converted from forest to non-forested land in Tien Hoang (SNV 2010). In 2007, Tien Hoang Commune developed a Master Land-use Plan for the period up to 2010. The document highlights the need to map out a plan to convert poor forests into high-value plantation forests, targeting a reduction in forestland area by 130 ha by the end of this period. Due to the GOV’s strict ban on shifting cultivation, large-scale clearing of forestland has been significantly curbed over the past decade. As seen in Table 23.2, at least some households in all villages reported a decrease in the opportunity for clearing forest during the two-year period prior to the CIFOR-GCS survey (2008-2010).

23.3.2 Sources of income

According to the 2009 commune statistics, 20% of all households are classified as poor (Tien Hoang CPC 2009). Data on percentage shares of household income in the four sample villages are displayed in Figure 23.3. This section will limit the discussion to the top three sources: crops, wage labor and forests.

8821.jpg

Figure 23.3 Sources of income for all households in sample (n = 120).

8833.jpg

Figure 23.4 Sources of income for average household by village (+/- SE) (n = 120).

Accounting for 35% of the total income, the two major agricultural crops (rice and cashew nuts) were the most significant source of income in the study area. While rice was the key subsistence crop for most households, cashew nuts were valued for their cash income. This perennial crop is grown on degraded forestland that has been converted for agricultural purposes and allocated to households. Between 2005 and 2008, cashew was the most lucrative cash crop, following a rapid expansion in plantation area. In 2009, the total cashew area was 5345 ha, comprising 37% forestland and 63% of forestland converted for agricultural purposes. Converted forestland has been allocated to households via forestland-use certificates (Red Book) for 50 years. Households are allowed to use the land allocated, following the government’s land-use plans/projects, and are entitled to receive initial support in the form of seedlings, fertilizer and agricultural extension services.

The second largest source of income (approximately 22%) was from wage labor. Within this category, the largest share was from forestry work. While the total income from cashew may be more significant, it is not a monthly revenue. Wage labor with a steady flow of cash was important in local livelihoods, especially during pre-harvest periods when a shortage of cash is more marked. Families without this source of steady cash income tended to take out loans, either cash or in-kind from local lenders or merchants, with steep interest rates. This was one of the reasons for illegal hunting and logging activities in the study villages. Those who were unable to repay the loans in cash, could do so in-kind, which includes paying with wildlife and timber products.

As seen in Figure 23.4, average household income from wage labor was substantially higher in LDCT1 than in the other three villages. Furthermore, approximately 30% of income under this category came from forestry-related wages earned by LDCT1 households. Table 23.2 shows that 47% of LDCT1 households earned cash income from forests, nearly double that of households in the other three villages. This may be explained by the fact that LDCT1 is a shorter distance from and has easier access to natural forests (as seen in Table 23.2). In addition, the average size of forest areas allocated to LDCT1 households is almost double the area allocated to households in the other three villages.

Cash income from forests may be derived from two types of wage labor: (i) forest protection fees paid by the government, and (ii) work as illegal loggers or hunters. In the case of LDCT1, the significant amount of income from wage labor cannot come from forest protection fees because the government’s fee under the Program 661 is minimal8 and PES was not available in LDCT1 at the time of this study. Approximately 36% of LDCT1 villagers reported a reduction in cash income from forestry during the two years prior to the survey, whereas villagers in LDCT3 and LDCT4 did not observe this trend (Table 23.2).

The third largest source of income was from forests, accounting for 18% of the total household income. Figure 23.4 shows a significantly higher income from forests in LDCT1 compared with that of the other three villages. LDCT1 is notorious for illegal forest extraction activities in Cat Tien, and it was difficult to obtain data on the timber and wildlife trade.9 In 2009, Tien Hoang Commune confiscated 18 m3 of illegally logged timber. This figure increased to 30 m3 in 2012. Furthermore, local forest protection officials believe the actual amount of timber extracted illegally is a lot higher. Data from this study seems to confirm their observations. While not many households engaged in illegal logging, among those practicing this business, the average volume of timber harvested per household was 23 m3/year.

As seen in Table 23.2, almost all villagers used fuelwood as the primary cooking fuel and were engaged in fuelwood collection. Results from village and gender group discussions revealed that villagers did not collect NTFPs for commercial purposes,10 but a wide variety of forest vegetables and root plants continued to be the major part of their diet. Villagers from the local ethnic group (both men and women) viewed access to this resource as vital. However, as seen in Table 23.2, between 14% and 43% of villagers reported a decrease in consumption of forest products. This is partly due to the government forest access restrictions and to the decline of forest resources. More than half of all respondent households (56%) cited government restrictions as the top reason for the decline in opportunities to clear land.

In conclusion, in monetary terms, forest incomes may not be the top livelihood strategy in the study area (except for a number of households in LDCT1). However, access to forestland to grow perennial crops was important in the local household economy. Fuelwood from both natural forests and degraded forestland was essential for all four villages. NTFPs continued to be an important part of people’s livelihoods, and were particularly appreciated by the local ethnic groups. There has been a general reduction in consumption of and opportunities to access forest resources.

23.3.3 The Cat Tien initiative in Tien Hoang

The only field-based activity that the Cat Tien initiative carried out in Tien Hoang Commune was the training and piloting of participatory forest monitoring. SNV subcontracted Tay Nguyen University to design and deliver the training courses. A number of village heads and male villagers received the training, participated in the activity and received payment for their involvement.

The CIFOR-GCS survey results showed that by early 2010, interviewed villagers had no knowledge about the initiative or about REDD+ in general. Due to the absence of appropriate methodologies and concerns about raising communities’ expectations, SNV did not carry out any awareness-raising activities on REDD+ or FPIC. By mid-2011, most villagers had heard about climate change via radio and government television broadcasts, and only some village heads were exposed to the REDD+ concept through their participation in the participatory forest monitoring activities. These village heads mentioned the SNV initiative but were unable to explain it beyond the participatory forest monitoring activities. One village head explained to fellow villagers: “REDD+ means millions of Vietnam dong11 to protect forests, and we won’t have to worry about land-use change.” In early 2014, a couple of years after the initiative was completed, the villagers continued to express their eagerness to learn more about REDD+.

23.4 Challenges facing the initiative

SNV believes that the success of any REDD+ scheme will ultimately depend on how effectively it is designed and introduced. Setting the goal to conserve rhino through a pilot REDD+ initiative could arguably be a shortcoming in its design. The forces driving rhino poaching are not the same as those driving deforestation and forest degradation. As the first pilot REDD+ initiative in Vietnam, Cat Tien posed another set of challenges for SNV. As an evolving concept with much uncertainty, there was a certain level of initial resistance to REDD+ both internally within SNV and externally from the government. In 2009, SNV did not see REDD+ as an effective means to achieve their pro-poor agenda. However, the REDD+ team managed to get their portfolio noticed by SNV senior management by tailoring their products, integrating REDD+ with other programs and building on the existing expertise at SNV. During its implementation, the initiative encountered multiple challenges including the complexity of methodologies, and the difficulty of both getting REDD+ off the ground and penetrating higher levels of decision making in Vietnam. This prevented SNV from achieving the scale and replicability that the organization had initially aimed for, thus jeopardizing its members’ ability to communicate and effectively influence policy making.

Results from a survey interview with SNV on proponent challenges showed that more than half of the 62 factors possibly influencing implementation were viewed by the proponent as large challenges.12 Among the factors related to REDD+, political economy (BAU interests)13 and policies (international, regional and national) were dominant. SNV considered the most overwhelming challenge to be the ‘economics of REDD+.’ If REDD+ initiatives are not able to compete with other land uses, including rubber and coffee, their success rates will be low.

A_Chau_Ma_elder.JPG

Chau Ma ethnic minority villager, Cat Tien district. (Thu Ba Huynh/CIFOR)

Another challenge that seems to impede SNV’s policy agenda is the coordination and collaboration among different government agencies. SNV is particularly concerned with unclear forestland ownership/rights and improvements needed in terms of coordination between the two GOV ministries dealing with land (the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment). SNV has taken actions at the subnational level via their land-use planning activities with provincial and district authorities. Yet, in this context, the organization does not anticipate any radical reforms to the current tenure arrangements. Despite their extensive REDD+ involvement, SNV’s influence on the tenure discussions at the national level is somewhat limited.

23.5 Lessons from the initiative

SNV has helped to blaze a trail for REDD+ in Vietnam. After attempting to lay the groundwork for funding the Cat Tien initiative through the forest carbon market, it discovered the limitations of the project approach and switched to working on REDD+ at a higher scale. Lessons learned through the Cat Tien experience have enabled SNV to contribute to provincial and national REDD+ development. At the national level, SNV has been playing a leading role in the Sub-technical Working groups on Local Implementation, BDS and Safeguards. Their REDD+ portfolio grew from one to six projects in Lam Dong Province, adopting a landscape approach and aiming to support the formulation and implementation of Provincial REDD+ Action Programs.

REDD+ has successfully penetrated the highest level of political spheres in Vietnam with the National REDD+ Action Program’s approval in 2012. It was observed at the national level that REDD+ created a foundation to move toward more interactive policy making via experimentation of new ideas and mechanisms with contributions from new actors. The GOV made the initial effort to bring various forces and actors together to discuss issues, and to find and execute solutions (i.e. via the operations of Sub-technical Working groups and the national REDD+ network). Thus, in a structured manner, REDD+ policy processes in Vietnam have provided a platform for non-state actors to explore their underpinning values and to interact with each other. However, organizations such as SNV have been hampered from having a more substantial influence on positive policy outcomes, partly due to the institutional inertia that is embedded in both state and non-state agencies.

Development of international NGOs in Vietnam has occurred under cumbersome registration and approval procedures, and relatively strict surveillance and control (Hannah 2007). This has influenced the focus/mandate of their programs and led to a more pragmatic approach toward policy making, and ultimately created a type of institutional inertia. In a country such as Vietnam, it is important for policy actors to know how to strategically handle the policy process. In addition, they must recognize the country’s unique political structure and the complex nature of the political landscape, infused as it is with protected values of stability and social order. Pushing for ambitious technical progress on REDD+ prior to establishing strong political support and consensus for it could be a recipe for failure.

External pressures and global trends may facilitate the introduction of new ideas but could also pose risks of ‘push-back,’ thereby slowing down change and widening ideological schisms. Thayer (2010) remarked that, despite its “soft-authoritarian” and one-party regime, Vietnam seeks its political legitimacy from multiple sources, including speeding up the scope and pace of political change. An open-mindedness in political approach will allow for space and opportunities to enhance legitimacy and collaboration, open up ‘freedom to maneuver’ and bring about changes.

Vietnam is considered a pioneering REDD+ country, where the GOV and REDD+ practitioners are under much pressure and expectations to deliver. This chapter suggests that the time, resources and approach required to catalyze change should not be underestimated and must be considered carefully in the design of REDD+ initiatives and policy processes.

The World Economic Forum (2013) claims, “civil society’s time has come.” Professor Dang Huu, president of the Vietnam Institute of Development Studies said in 2006: “As the reform process moves forward, unique opportunities are created for Vietnamese policy and lawmakers to promote an enabling environment for the establishment and growth of non-state organizations.” This chapter argues that the enabling environment should be created and facilitated, not only by the Vietnamese policy makers but also by other non-state policy actors. In the context of REDD+, these actors should envision their influence beyond a limited thematic focus and aim for a broader view of social change. Building political intelligence with a broad alliance via collective actions, while creating a social learning process where actors could share and hold each other accountable, are useful starting points.

23.6 Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the support of my colleagues in SNV: Richard McNally, Adrian Enright, Tim Holland, Steve Swan, Ms Ly Minh Hai and Nguyen Trung Thong. It would not have been possible to obtain such a body of empirical data and insights without their assistance. I am indebted to the communities in Cat Tien, who shared their shelter, food and beautiful stories. I would like to extend my warmest thanks to the CIFOR-GCS team and the Vietnamese enumerators Le Minh Dang, Le Kieu Oanh and Pham Ngoc Nam.

1 SNV is a nonprofit, international development organization, established in the Netherlands in 1965.

2 This initiative will be referred to as the Cat Tien initiative in this chapter.

3 Currently, there are over 12,000 biogas digesters replicated all over the country.

4 The Golden Forest: Reforestation CDM case study from North Central Vietnam was published in 2007 (see Doet 2007).

5 WWF calls CTNP the “Last refuge for a lost animal.”

6 In Vietnam, there are 54 ethnic groups, with 87% of the population belonging to the largest group: the Kinh ethnicity.

7 There was both planned and spontaneous migration. The planned migration took place within the framework of the government’s New Economic Zones in the 1960s. The program aimed to (i) redistribute population and resources, (ii) strengthen national solidarity and defense, and (iii) reduce environmental degradation in densely populated areas. The strategy was to encourage lowlanders and ethnic minorities from mountain areas in the north and from crowded urban areas in the south to settle in the Central Highlands with support from the government.

8 Under the National Five Million Hectare Reforestation Programme, households sign forest protection contracts with forest owners (i.e. national parks, state-owned companies, people’s committees) and receive VND 100,000/ha/year, equivalent to USD 5 and less than the value of a kilogram of cashew in the local market.

9 Immediately prior to CIFOR-GCS field work, intense investigations took place in the study area because of the death of the last Javan rhino in CTNP.

10 This excludes bamboo shoots, which are collected when a shortage of cash is keenly felt during preharvesting seasons or when there is an emergency need for cash (e.g. bamboo shoots are readily available in markets and along the roadsides before schools open in early September. This is when children and families try to earn cash to pay for school fees).

11 Vietnamese currency.

12 CIFOR-GCS conducted its proponent challenges survey interview with SNV on 10 December 2012.

13 In the proponent challenges survey, BAU interests were defined as “the constellation of political and economic actors who have or will derive economic benefit from continued legal conversion of forests to non-forest uses and/or continued degradation of forests.” (Sunderlin et al. 2014, 13).

 

Box J
REDD+ in Vietnam: The national context