The Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative was developed by the Government of Aceh (GoA) during the governorship of Irwandi Yusuf (2007–2012). Irwandi’s strategy (known as ‘Aceh Green’) aimed to improve Aceh’s economy and environment (Dunlop 2009). During that period, the province of Aceh had just recovered from an extended period of armed conflict and the destructive 2004 tsunami. This REDD+ initiative was among the first established globally (Sills et al. 2009; Minang and Noordwijk 2013). It planned to develop and apply the mechanism of carbon finance in order to reduce GHG emissions, contribute to sustainable socioeconomic development, improve forest management, protect watersheds and conserve biodiversity.

Aceh experienced decades of conflict, which impacted the current context of forests and REDD+ in the province. Unsafe conditions forced centrally licensed timber concessionaires to halt their operations. Similarly, conflict greatly circumscribed Aceh’s agricultural development. As a result, although illegal logging occurred during the period – partially to finance guerrilla operations – conflict largely protected the forests of Aceh, in contrast to many forested areas in other parts of Sumatra and in Kalimantan. The disastrous tsunami in 2004 ended the protracted conflict, culminating in the 2005 Peace Agreement. Peace in Aceh has enabled local people to clear forests for agriculture. Moreover, demand for timber in post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction has significantly increased pressures on Aceh’s forests. Illegal logging, notably by ex-combatants, also continues. Irwandi Yusuf introduced his green vision to counteract these problems in Aceh, giving environmental considerations prominence in Aceh’s policies.

To some extent, the context of REDD+ in Aceh is different from that of other areas in Indonesia because of its special autonomous status (Law 18 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam).1 Aceh has the power to make its own laws, called Qanun. In 2002, for example, the Aceh Government issued a Qanun on the management of natural resources. The province has more authority over its development in comparison to most other provinces of Indonesia. The province also gets a disproportionate share of development funding and natural resource revenue from the central government. Its autonomy was further strengthened by Law 11 of 2006 on Aceh Governance. However, Aceh’s augmented authority is unclear with regard to the management of forests. This is because areas within forest zones (kawasan hutan), including those in Aceh, are under the purview of MoFor. Furthermore, the implementing regulations for Law 11 of 2006 that would set out and clarify Aceh’s authority, have not been formulated. These ambiguities arguably have implications for the implementation of any REDD+ projects/initiatives.

A recent change in leadership has placed the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative in a state of limbo; its status as of 2014 is uncertain. It has not been formally terminated, nor is it being continued. However, REDD+ has not finished in Aceh, but has taken a different focus; it continues at the policy level.

22.1 Basic facts: Where, who, why and when

22.1.1 Geography

Located in the northern part of Sumatra (Figure 22.1), the inland zone of Aceh is dominated by the Bukit Barisan Mountain range. In Aceh, this range covers 3.3 million ha of dense forest – the Leuser and Ulu Masen ecosystems (GoA 2007). Both ecosystems are known for their rich biodiversity, in particular the endangered Sumatran orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii) and Sumatran tigers (Panthera tigris sumatrae). The Leuser ecosystem covers 2.5 million ha that have been designated as conservation, protection and production forests. The 624,000 ha Gunung Leuser National Park, established in 1980, is situated in these forests.

Compared to the Leuser ecosystem, the Ulu Masen ecosystem, with 750,000 ha, was not as well known before the REDD+ initiative was formally declared in 2009, although it is critically important for both its biodiversity and its multiple river catchment areas (Nando 2008). The bulk of Ulu Masen is situated within the forest zone, i.e. state forestland under the purview of MoFor. Data on the formal classification of Ulu Masen forests vary. One source states that about 300,000 ha have been designated as protection and conservation forests, 400,000 ha as production forests that can be logged, and 5000 ha as areas for community development (GoA 2007).2 Another calculation suggests that protection forests make up 570,000 ha, nature reserves 17,000 ha, production forests 84,000 ha, and areas for other uses (Areal Penggunaan Lain [APL] i.e. outside the forest zone) approximately 80,000 ha (personal communication from an Aceh province forestry official, 2014).3

About 70% of Ulu Masen’s topography is hilly and mountainous and the remainder is flat and sloping. Ulu Masen’s forests comprise 39% lowland broadleaf forest, 34% pine forest, 19% lower montane broadleaf and 8% montane broadleaf. Lowland forests are the most prone to deforestation and degradation (GoA 2007). The area of Ulu Masen encompasses five districts: Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, Pidie, Pidie Jaya and Aceh Barat (GoA 2007). More recent efforts to delineate the ecosystem suggest that Ulu Masen extends into the administrative boundaries of another district, Aceh Tengah (personal communication from an Aceh province forestry official, 2014). The Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative aimed to protect the entire contiguous ecosystem, avoiding fragmentation associated with administrative boundaries. Aceh’s total population in 2010 was 4.5 million people (BPS Aceh 2010). According to the 2005 census, the population of Ulu Masen was approximately 130,000 people (GoA 2007), distributed across 65 kemukiman.4 Many of Ulu Masen’s people live adjacent to and are directly dependent on forests, most notably as a source of land for agriculture.

22.1.2 Stakeholders and funding

Prior to the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative, the World Bank funded the Aceh Forest and Environment Project (AFEP). The aim of AFEP was to address deforestation and degradation caused by the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts in parts of Leuser and Ulu Masen areas (Kasia et al. 2011). The Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative extended AFEP’s efforts into the entire Ulu Masen area.

Several stakeholders supported the initiative. As the lead proponent, the GoA initiated and was responsible for the overall management of the initiative. Units under the GoA specifically mandated to develop the framework of the initiative were the Aceh Green Team (comprised mostly of technical consultants) and the Aceh REDD+ Task Force (comprised of government officials). Carbon Conservation Ltd. managed the business side of REDD+, including the planning, design and identification of potential markets for future carbon credits. Fauna and Flora International (FFI), working under AFEP, supported the GoA in preparatory activities on the ground, notably those involving communities, such as FPIC.

These key players interacted with several provincial agencies: Bappeda (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah – the provincial planning agency), Bapedalda (Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah – the provincial environmental unit), the forestry service, the agricultural service and administrative units. These agencies contributed mostly time and effort to the initiative, rather than project financing, and in return, government officials gained knowledge about topics including geographic information systems, MRV, and REDD+ and climate change.

The intention from the beginning of the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative was to start with off-budget funds (funds additional to the formally approved budget) and then tap into the forest carbon market. The initial start-up costs of the initiative were paid with official development assistance (ODA) (GoA 2007) and the flurry of donor funds that arrived for rehabilitation and reconstruction post-tsunami. FFI synchronized their activities under AFEP with the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative, and hence most of their activities for the REDD+ initiative were funded through AFEP (Rainforest Alliance 2008). The team of consultants in Aceh Green was fully financed by the Aceh Government Transition Program (AGTP) funds and managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The costs of the Aceh REDD+ Task Force were borne by the GoA.

Efforts to access the carbon market were led by Carbon Conservation. To secure future financing, Carbon Conservation signed an agreement with Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch agreed to provide USD 9 million over four years in three stages upon verified reduction of deforestation and degradation in Ulu Masen, beginning in 2007 (SSNC 2013). The status of this arrangement is unknown.

Carbon Conservation sought other funding sources. Unilaterally, Carbon Conservation, which sold some of its shares to the Canada-based gold mining company East Asia Minerals (EAM), made an agreement with the latter to ‘sell’ the carbon emission reductions from the Ulu Masen initiative. This purchase was to be used to offset EAM’s carbon emissions associated with their mining activities within Ulu Masen and in other areas. The GoA rejected this plan, as it was contradictory to the spirit of the REDD+ initiative and their vision of forest conservation. EAM obtained access to mining areas within Ulu Masen by financing the exploration costs of three domestic companies holding the mining permits (Taylor 2011).5 These permits were issued in 2009 by the district government to replace the previous mining concession licenses (kuasa pertambangan) granted three years earlier by the national government over the same area, as mandated by the new mining law. This internal wrangling occurred before any carbon credits were traded. The disagreement terminated the partnership between the GoA and Carbon Conservation.

The Aceh Green Team and REDD+ Task Force stated on several occasions that the main goal of the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative was to improve forest management and that emission reductions would be an additional co-benefit. Any additional monies generated from carbon credits were not considered to be the main goal but a ‘bonus.’

22.1.3 Motivation

Various threats to forests motivated Governor Irwandi and the GoA to undertake the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative. Forests came under pressure from both local people living within the boundaries of Ulu Masen and from outsiders. Activities within Ulu Masen that threaten forests include large-scale agriculture, large-scale plantations (pulp timber, oil palm), mining (both small-and large-scale) especially in Aceh Jaya and Pidie districts, small-scale illegal timber harvesting, and land clearing for smallholder agricultural expansion and hunting (i.e. burning bushes to facilitate deer hunting, which can result in out-of-control fires).6

Before 2000, there were at least six concessions (GoA 2007) in Ulu Masen, but these became inactive, first due to conflict and later due to the logging moratorium in 2007 instituted across Aceh by Governor Irwandi. Parts of these areas are now being used for agriculture and parts are being logged by local communities. Demand for timber has increased due to the rebuilding and rehabilitation of Aceh post-tsunami. Lubis et al. (2008) estimated that some 500,000 m3 of timber was needed for the reconstruction. Thus, rehabilitation and reconstruction has put more pressure on the forests.

Indonesia’s supportive agricultural policies and booming commodity markets also influenced land use in Aceh. Expansion of oil palm plantations is occurring in parts of Aceh, where forestland is being converted to non-forestry uses. Various companies are actively seeking new land clearing permits to plant woody trees for pulp material and rubber trees in the area of Ulu Masen (GoA 2007).

The local transmigration program (translok) is also affecting land use in Aceh. This program moves local people from other parts of Aceh, notably victims of the conflict. The government provides participating households with housing and agricultural plots, which are often established by clearing forests. Households that received housing and agricultural land support will obtain an official land certificate four years after they have settled in an area.

22.1.4 Timeline

Forestry and conservation interventions started in Ulu Masen in 2006 as part of AFEP. In 2007, the governor announced Aceh Green Vision as the development strategy for the province. To realize this vision, in the same year the governor decreed a logging moratorium which banned all logging activities in Aceh. In 2008, the GoA and Carbon Conservation signed a partnership agreement, followed by the agreement between the company and Merill Lynch.

In July 2009, Ulu Masen was officially declared a REDD+ intervention area through a decree by the governor, and the REDD+ Task Force was established the following January to coordinate all activities related to REDD+ in Aceh.7 MRV pilot surveys and FPIC both began in 2010.

After the completion of AFEP at the end of 2011, all on-the-ground activities related to REDD+ came to a halt. In 2012, the new governor, who did not share the views of his predecessor, installed new policies and stopped implementing the previous administration’s green strategy. Although the mandate of the REDD+ Task Force remains in place, the future of the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative is unclear. Figure 22.2 summarizes the key events related to the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative.

22.2 Strategy for the initiative

The main objective of the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative was to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, carry out reforestation, restore and enhance carbon stocks in existing forests, and improve forest management. One of its aims, for instance, was to reduce illegal logging carried out by ex-combatants through forest patrols and monitoring activities, and by providing alternative livelihoods for them. The initiative was planned to operate for 30 years and generate 3.3 million tCO2e in emissions reductions per year, while reducing deforestation by 85% (GoA 2007; Rainforest Alliance 2008). It would be funded through ODA financing and carbon sales. The proceeds from the sale of carbon credits were expected to finance conservation and development projects for local communities within its boundaries.

The initiative was also expected to alleviate poverty and empower local communities. Several interventions or activities were planned, including introducing the use of steel material for housing as an alternative to wood. The most significant planned intervention was the reexamination of tenure rights. This intervention was expected to be carried out in areas under central government logging licenses that were no longer active and were currently being used by communities. The aim was to clarify tenure and ensure that the rent from the management of these forests accrued to the provincial government.

Irwandi’s succession in 2012 has led to an uncertain future for Ulu Masen REDD+. Consequently, no activities specifically done under the initiative have been carried out since the election. Many plans have remained only plans and have not been implemented, including the promotion of non-wood alternative materials for housing and the clarification of tenure rights over ex-logging concession areas.

Between the designation of Ulu Masen REDD+ and the installment of the new governor in 2012, only a few undertakings have actually been implemented. They include livelihood enhancement activities, forest patrols, pilot MRVs and FPIC at the kemukiman level. Livelihood enhancement activities were carried out mostly under AFEP (see Figure 22.2). They included the development of low-impact, community-based agroforestry, and commodity crops within areas zoned for such activities and with the participation of communities. One intervention was the distribution of cocoa seedlings as an alternative livelihood to steer people away from illegal logging activities. Although AFEP has now ended, forest monitoring by forest rangers is being continued by the communities. Forest rangers also carry out other associated environmental tasks in or nearby forest areas, such as monitoring water dams. These forest rangers complement the role of the forest police. The latter report to the forestry service and are responsible for enforcing access restrictions to conservation and protection areas in Aceh, including within the boundaries of Ulu Masen.

Activities specifically attributed to REDD+ were mostly preparatory activities. These included the establishment of pilot MRV, verification for VCS and FPIC with stakeholders. Verification of the project design was validated in 2008 by Smart Wood and the initiative was granted a Silver CCBA standard (Rainforest Alliance 2008).

MRV activities were limited to pilot MRV areas. They were conducted as part of capacity building for the task force members prior to the planned MRV implementation. Nevertheless, a survey from this undertaking collected samples of belowground biomass and identified species of trees and their diversity in every stratification area. Early assessment of GHG emissions to complete the project design applied a tier 2 approach, where country specific emission factors were used as a basis for calculation.8 Both the MRV methods and the REL for the site have not been established.

Similarly, there were not yet any specific arrangements or mechanisms for benefit-sharing among stakeholders. Although the GoA elaborated several benefit sharing mechanism options in their PDD, none of them were applied in practice because the REDD+ initiative has not been implemented beyond the preparatory phase.

22.3 Smallholders in the initiative

Local governance is described in Qanun 4 of 2003 on Mukim Governance and Qanun 5 of 2003 on Gampong (village) Governance. Mukim or kemukiman is a customary governance system consisting of a cluster of several adjacent villages (gampong) and is led by the head of a kemukiman. Each gampong within a kemukiman has its own administrative boundaries. Similar to other villages in Indonesia, a gampong administration includes a head of village (geuchik) who is elected, a village secretary (sekdes), and heads of affairs (kepala urusan). In addition, they have customary structures (tuhapeut, a religious or adat body) that govern the village collectively. Tuhapeut consists of five members, mostly four men and one woman where each member is responsible for one specific issue such as culture, wedding, deaths and women’s issues. However, in some villages, tuhapeut has now become inactive. Among those institutions, the geuchik, village secretary and kepala urusan are the most important. Women participate peripherally in village decision-making processes and their input is often limited to attending meetings.

CIFOR surveyed four villages within the boundaries of Ulu Masen targeted by the proponents (intervention villages), UM1, UM2, UM3 and UM4. Thirty-three households were selected in each village using a random sampling method. A total of 132 households were interviewed from a population of 306 households. The majority (99%) of the village population was Acehnese. Most people of other ethnicities (e.g. the Javanese) left Aceh during the conflict period. The socioeconomic characteristics of the households that were interviewed are summarized in Table 22.1.

Public services in these villages were relatively poor. No household had piped water (Table 22.1). Households obtained water by pumping from the nearby rivers, irrigation canals and wells. None of the villages had a health center. UM1 had better sanitation facilities compared to the other three villages: about three-quarters of the sampled households had a private toilet, which was provided by a development NGO post-tsunami. In 2014, all four villages had access to electricity.

The average years of education among villagers was low. In UM1, UM2 and UM4, the mean education attainment was primary school. All villages except UM4 had an elementary school; a secondary school was only found in UM3, reflected in a higher mean education level of seven years of study (secondary school).

Household annual incomes were similar in UM1, UM2 and UM3, ranging from USD 1300 to 1500, while UM4 had a considerably higher average of about USD 3000. In this village, many villagers reworked their previously productive gardens, which they had abandoned during conflict, and cleared new agricultural land. More than half of households sampled perceived that their income was adequate to cover household needs. Across all households in the sample, income was mainly generated by wages or through other avenues (Figure 22.3).

Agriculture was an important source of income for all study villages. However, in UM1 and UM4, the largest income share came from other sources, such as the flurry of work during Aceh’s rehabilitation and reconstruction aid, and alms and inheritance. In UM2 and UM3, wage labor reached the highest income share of the total household income (Figure 22.4). In these two villages, many households took agricultural labor work – working for other smallholders – in neighboring villages. On average, each household in UM1, UM3 and UM4 controlled less than 1.5 ha of land; in UM2 each household controlled 2 ha (Table 22.1).

Forest is less significant as a source of income compared to agriculture. Among the four villages, a larger proportion of households in UM3 and UM4 compared to UM1 and UM2 obtained cash income from forests during the two years prior to the survey (Table 22.2). In UM4, a large proportion of the village area was forest; about 40% of the households in UM4 were making cash from forests. UM3 had little forest but villagers’ cash income from forest was high; UM3 households often access the forests of neighboring UM4. Cash income from these two villages appears to be associated with illegal logging activities in the area. Very few villagers in our sites collected NTFPs, fuelwood and timber; villagers can get to the nearest forests in 1–2 hours on foot. Our survey shows that fuelwood was harvested by more than 60% of women in the villages. In the near future, the use of fuelwood is expected to decline because of the effect of the government program on the introduction of liquid petroleum gas.

Between 21% and 33% of households in all of the villages, except for UM2, had cleared forest in the two years prior to the 2010 survey, and clearing was exclusively for agricultural purposes. Those who cleared forests, cleared on average 3 ha in UM1, but this was much lower in UM3 and UM4 (i.e. less than 0.1 and 0.05 ha, respectively). In UM1 and UM2, more than half of respondents stated that they had less opportunity to clear forest in the two years prior to the survey because of: government restrictions, increased distance to forests, preference for sedentary farming and lack of capital. In UM2, forest rangers forbade villagers to clear forests. In UM3 and UM4, about one-third of respondents said that they had more opportunity to clear forests, due to lack of armed conflict and a growing interest in agricultural cultivation.

UM4 has recently been designated as a ‘transition village’; it is part of a government program to build new houses for conflict victims. This translok program relocated households from neighboring villages to UM4. About one hundred houses were built for this purpose; this has resulted in the expansion of cocoa cultivation and has placed increased pressure on surrounding forests.

22.4 Challenges facing the initiative

Ulu Masen REDD+ has faced several challenges. One challenge has been the lack of support from the general public in Aceh. Public acceptance towards REDD+ is low (and there is a sense of ambivalence) because other activities such as oil palm and mining are perceived to be more attractive in terms of the revenue and income streams that they generate. According to the proponent, communities are increasingly aware of the risks of deforestation but are questioning the benefits of REDD+. This skepticism was amplified by the lack of tangible benefits flowing into villages from REDD+. Local communities are more likely to opt for short-term benefit, such as planting agricultural commodities, instead of long-term benefits from forests (e.g. by establishing tree plantations). REDD+ has to compete with these activities, as agro-industrial crops are perceived to be far more profitable per unit of forest area than keeping the forests standing.

The threat to the integrity of the Ulu Masen forest ecosystems also comes from beneath the forests. High and commercial value ore and minerals – gold, copper, iron and coal – are found in protected forests of Aceh Besar, Pidie, Aceh Barat, Aceh Jaya and Aceh Tengah. These deposits pose a challenge for conservation efforts post-conflict as pressures to exploit natural resources increase due to demands for development (McCulloch 2010).

The invigorated traditional governance system, where important decisions and information inflows concentrate at the kemukiman level, is unique to Aceh and has implications for REDD+ implementation. The process of FPIC stopped at this level, involving mostly kemukiman leaders and some village representatives. REDD+ involves managing land use at the lowest level, so both information flows and FPIC processes would be more effective if carried out at village level as the lowest unit of settlements. However, as Ulu Masen is such a large area comprising around 200 villages (Forest Peoples Programme 2011), this would not be an easy task.

Lack of understanding about climate change and REDD+ among local communities and other stakeholders (including units within the local government) pose another challenge in implementing REDD+. Awareness about REDD+ and climate change was facilitated by NGOs. Because the REDD+ concept was fairly new, the expertise of NGO field staff was also limited. Hence, information that trickled down to communities varied, was often incomplete and easily created confusion. For example, there was a perception that the carbon project would take over people’s land and as a result, landowners would lose their rights to their land. The way in which information is communicated and what is communicated to the community is important in shaping the public perception of REDD+. This is critical in particular because Aceh is currently at a turning point in terms of the future of the Ulu Masen REDD+ initiative.

As in other areas in Indonesia, a significant challenge emerges from the ambiguity of tenure rights. In all four intervention villages, the ownership of land is mostly inherited. Idle lands abandoned by timber concessions – state lands – are claimed by local communities as theirs. This occurred in UM4. In UM2 and UM3 villages, local people took over lands left by transmigrants who fled Aceh because of conflict. Most of the current users thus do not have official land certificates because these lands de jure belong to the transmigrants. These unclear tenure arrangements can have implications when REDD+ is implemented, in particular with regard to benefit sharing.

The ‘euphoria’ of REDD+ at the global level has largely ceased due to the endless negotiations to achieve an international climate agreement. The resulting uncertainty with regard to funding streams and REDD+ architecture has affected the progress of REDD+ on the ground. Issues associated with dependence on short-term availability of external funding (AFEP and UNDP), unsustainable political support, and perceived unattractiveness of REDD+, have halted the momentum for Ulu Masen REDD+ in Aceh.

The special autonomy status means that the GoA has authority over land-use decisions, including forest management or REDD+. Inconsistencies and ambiguities in the legal regulatory framework make it a challenge in practice. For example, the forest zone – within which most of Ulu Masen is classified – is legally under the purview of MoFor. Although the national government can act as a check for the GoA’s inappropriate policies over areas within the forest zone, it can also circumscribe the GoA’s appropriate forestry policies that are not consistent with national policy.

22.5 Lessons from the initiative

The case of Ulu Masen illustrates well the vulnerability of jurisdictional REDD+ to electoral politics. The REDD+ initiative was proposed by Irwandi, who had a ‘green’ vision. The current leader, however, does not place environmental goals as high on his agenda as his predecessor. Some environmentally friendly decisions nevertheless are being continued under his term, including a logging moratorium. According to a key informant, the new governor’s actions are more about distancing himself from his predecessor, rather than being inattentive to environmental issues. As a consequence, the fate of the Ulu Masen initiative is now uncertain. While no formal decisions have been made to end the initiative, no REDD+ activities are being carried out either. Political commitment, therefore, has been an important determinant for the trajectory of Ulu Masen REDD+. To help ensure continuity, climate change mitigation initiatives such as REDD+ need to be mainstreamed in the GoA’s short-, medium- and long-term development plans. Despite its importance, the Ulu Masen area has not been formally recognized (and designated) as an integrated and distinct ecosystem. Former Governor Irwandi had proposed that the area be designated as a Strategic Ecosystem Area in the province’s Long Term Plan 2012–2025, but it was rejected by Aceh’s legislature.

As of the time of writing (October 2014), there are no signs that the new governor will support the continuation of Ulu Masen REDD+ and thus no REDD+ activities are being carried out at the local level. However, Aceh is engaged in REDD+ at another level. The province has recently completed its Strategy and Action Plan for REDD+ (SRAP REDD+) (Bappeda 2013) and its Action Plan for the Reduction of GHG emissions (RAD-GRK) (BAPPENAS 2011). The SRAP REDD+ was prepared as part of the REDD+ Agency’s program, as an elaboration of the National REDD+ Strategy at the provincial level. The RAD-GRK was prepared as part of the BAPPENAS (Ministry of National Development Planning) program to elaborate the RAN-GRK. Aceh is about to sign a memorandum of understanding with the national REDD+ agency on cooperation in climate change mitigation. Aceh also continues to be a member of the Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force.

One important lesson from the experience of Ulu Masen REDD+ is the need for an adequate preparatory phase, including a clearly defined workable strategy and design. Ulu Masen was one of the first REDD+ initiatives that made the headlines in the international media following the COP 13 in Bali. Lack of capacity and resources has meant that the GoA had to depend on external actors during the entire process of REDD+ establishment, including the planning, designing, implementing and marketing phases. This ‘fast-track’ process and high expectations, among others, have led to a bitter disagreement between the GoA and its partner, Carbon Conservation. Similarly, with the completion of AFEP, the funding that had supported FFI to implement community engagement activities was also exhausted. The partnership with these actors – either in terms of continued funding support or working relationship – partially defines the fate of the initiative.

22.6 Acknowledgments

We would like to convey our utmost thanks to all members and leaders of the communities of the study villages for all their time, support and friendship during our study. We are indebted to Fadmi Ridwan (Aceh REDD+ Task Force), Yakob Ishadamy (Aceh Green), Dedek Hadi (Aceh REDD+ Task Force) and all of the other resource persons working for the GoA for their valuable insights and support. We thank the local government of Aceh for its support of this research. We are very grateful for the dedication and perseverance of our field team members and data encoders: Aan, Abdul Mahmud, Mahlizar, Merlinta Anggilia, Putra, Jhon Roy Sirait and Mella Komalasari. We would like to thank Claudio de Sassi for providing the graphs and tables, and Stibniati Atmadja, Dedek Hadi and Agus Djoko Ismanto for reviewing the draft of this chapter.